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•JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction by virtue of transfer and assignment from the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) and § 78-2-2(4) (2000). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted Appellees' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Appellants' claim for lost sign revenue. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly denied Appellants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment as to whether Appellees breached the applicable standard of care as a 
matter of law. 
In considering an appeal from a trial court's decision of a summary judgment 
motion, the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party 
below. The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which 
are reviewed for correctness. (Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 
(Utah, 1989)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum 1. They are: 
UtahR. Civ. P. 41(a) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-136.4, 136.5, 136.6, 136.7 and 136.9 
Ut. Admin. Code R. 933-2, et seq. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Appellants Lynn D. Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen ("Kitchens")1 own property 
adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 2700 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah ("Kitchen 
Property"). In 1973 the Kitchens entered into a lease with Reagan Outdoor Advertising 
("Reagan") which lease granted Reagan the right to maintain an outdoor advertising sign on 
the Kitchen Property ("Reagan Lease"). The original term of the Reagan Lease was 20 
years. (R. 835-837). 
The original term of the Reagan Lease expired August 5, 1993. Thereafter, 
Reagan maintained its sign on the Kitchen Property under a month-to-month tenancy. (R. 
539, 563). In approximately August, 1994 a dispute arose between the Kitchens and 
Reagan as to whether or not Reagan had appropriately exercised its option to renew the 
Reagan Lease for another 20 year term - - Reagan claiming it had, the Kitchens claiming 
Reagan had not. (R. 456-462, 464-471, 473-483, 945-950). On September 13, 1994 the 
Kitchens served Reagan with a Notice to Quit. The Notice to Quit informed Reagan that if 
it failed to vacate the Kitchen Property by the end of September, 1994 Reagan would be 
deemed in unlawful detainer. (R. 563). 
'The Kitchens and appellants Edward Rogers, Terry Reid and Utah Outdoor 
Advertising, d.b.a., Utah Sign, Inc. are at times referred to collectively as "Appellants." 
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In September, 1994 Reagan filed three complaints against the Kitchens and 
Utah Outdoor Advertising aka Utah Sign, Inc. in Third District Court. The first Complaint, 
CV 940905718, was assigned to Judge David S. Young. The second filed Complaint, CV 
940905728, was assigned to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup. The third Complaint, CV 940905780, 
was assigned to Judge Glen Iwasaki. (R. 443 and see Addenda 3,4 and 5 attached hereto). 
At issue in the three complaints was whether Reagan had lawfully exercised its option to 
renew the Reagan Lease for another 20 year term. 
On October 8, 1994 Utah Sign removed Reagan's sign from the Kitchen 
Property. (R. 485). On October 11, 1994 Reagan dismissed its complaint in CV 
940905718. On October 14, 1994 Reagan dismissed its Complaint in CV 940905780. (R. 
443). On November 9, 1994 Reagan filed an Amended Complaint in CV 940905728 
alleging the specific facts of Utah Sign's illegal action in cutting down Reagan's sign. ("The 
Underlying Action"). (R. 473-483). 
After Utah Sign cut down Reagan's sign, the Kitchens and Appellants retained 
appellee Steven B. Mitchell and his law firm, Burbidge & Mitchell ("Mitchell") to represent 
them. After learning of the two previously filed and dismissed Complaints, Mitchell moved 
to reinstate the previously dismissed Complaints and consolidate them with the first-filed 
case. (R. 681 -683). 
In December, 1995 Appellants terminated Mitchell's representation of them 
and new counsel entered an appearance on Appellants' behalf. In January, 1997 the 
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Underlying Action settled. (R. 14-15, 355). In September, 1997 The Kitchens and Edward 
Rogers, Terry Reid and Utah Advertising, dba Utah Sign, Inc. ("Utah Sign") commenced 
this action alleging Mitchell committed various acts of legal malpractice in his representation 
of Appellants in the Underlying Action. Appellants' principal damage is for anticipated lost 
revenue from an outdoor advertising sign they desired to erect on the Kitchen Property. 
Appellants alleged Mitchell's legal malpractice caused the loss of this sign revenue. 
Mitchell moved for partial summary judgment on Appellant's lost sign revenue 
claim, arguing that neither the Kitchens nor Utah Sign could have lawfully maintained a sign 
on the Kitchen Property notwithstanding any act or inaction by Mitchell. The trial court 
granted Mitchell's partial summary judgment motion. (R. 1004-1007). 
Kitchens and Utah Sign moved for partial summary judgment arguing that as 
a matter of law Mitchell's conduct breached the standard of care. (R. 440-441). Mitchell 
also moved for summary judgment on the standard of care issue, arguing that as a matter of 
law Mitchell's conduct complied with the applicable standard of care. (R. 597-599). The 
trial court denied Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment and Mitchell's motion 
for summary judgment on the standard of care issue, concluding questions of fact existed 
as to whether the standard of care was breached. (R. 1004-1007). 
Subsequently, after Appellants amended their answers to interrogatories by 
identifying their claimed damages as only lost anticipated revenue from the outdoor 
advertising sign they desired to erect on the Kitchen Property, Mitchell moved for summary 
-4-
judgment. Mitchell argued that because the court previously granted summary judgment on 
the lost sign revenue claim, Appellants suffered no damages regardless of whether the 
standard of care was breached. (R. 1316-1335). Appellants did not oppose Mitchell's 
motion (R. 1340-41) and it was granted by the trial court. (R. 1345-47). 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Facts Relating to Lost Sign Revenue Claim 
In April, 1981 the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") granted 
Reagan a permit to maintain an outdoor advertising sign on the Kitchen Property. (R.320-
325). 
On September 28,1994, UDOT granted Reagan's request to relocate its sign 
approximately 166 feet south to property owned by Joe Doctorman & Son ("Doctorman 
property"). As of September 28, 1994, Reagan held a UDOT permit to lawfully maintain 
an outdoor Advertising sign on the Doctorman Property. Reagan completed the erection of 
the sign on the Doctorman property in approximately December, 1994. (R. 320-325, 800, 
897,906,910-911,913). 
On October 10, 1994, after UDOT had issued Reagan the permit to relocate 
its sign, Utah Sign applied for a UDOT permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the 
Kitchen Property. UDOT denied Utah Sign's application for, among other reasons, 
violation of a 500 foot spacing prohibition contained in the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136, et seg. The 500 foot prohibition prohibits the erection of any 
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outdoor advertising sign within 500 feet of an existing outdoor advertising sign. Reagan's 
sign which UDOT had authorized Reagan to relocate from the Kitchen Property to the 
Doctorman Property was the existing sign that precluded the erection of the sign sought in 
Utah Sign's application for UDOT permit. (R. 320-327). 
Arthur B. Coffin is the UDOT permits officer who granted Reagan's request 
to relocate its sign. He also subsequently denied Utah Sign's request for a UDOT permit. 
Mr. Coffin testified through affidavit that under the provisions of the Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act and UDOT rules adopted pursuant thereto, neither Utah Sign nor any other 
entity could have lawfully erected a sign on the Kitchen Property without a UDOT permit. 
Mr. Coffin testified that a sign could not be lawfully erected on the Kitchen Property as long 
as an outdoor advertising sign was maintained on the Doctorman Property. (R. 320-323). 
Mr. Coffin's testimony as to the various applications, and issuance of UDOT permits was 
uncontroverted before the trial court. 
B. Incorrect Statements of Fact Made by Appellants Relating to Lost Sign 
Revenue Claim 
In paragraph 24 of their Statement of Facts, Appellants state that on September 
2,1994, the date Utah Sign obtained a building permit from South Salt Lake City, "no other 
signs nor permits to build other signs existed within 500 feet of the Kitchen Property " 
Contrary to Appellants' claim, Reagan's sign was on the Kitchen Property at that time. The 
presence of Reagan's sign on the Kitchen Property at that time is not disputed by any fact 
of record. Paragraph 24 does not create a factual dispute. The portion of the record cited 
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by Appellants to support the factual statement is simply a copy of the South Salt Lake City 
building permit issued to Utah Sign. 
In paragraph 26 of their Statement of Facts, Appellants claim Reagan 
misrepresented to South Salt Lake City that its sign on the Kitchen Property would "come 
down" to induce the city to issue Reagan a building permit to relocate its sign to the 
Doctorman Property.2 However, it is undisputed the sign Reagan sought to relocate was 
owned by Reagan. Accordingly, if Reagan represented to South Salt Lake City that the sign 
would come down after the relocation, it was certainly an appropriate and reasonable 
representation. On October 8, 1994, before Regan removed its sign, Utah Sign cut down 
Reagan's sign and thereafter welded its sign on the remaining foundation. Utah Sign erected 
this sign without the necessary UDOT permit. (R. 485, 540, 646-648, 1138-1139). These 
facts are undisputed. The sign that remained on the Kitchen Property after Reagan obtained 
the Smith Salt Lake City permit was, therefore, Utah Sign's sign, not Reagan's. These facts 
are undisputed. 
Finally, paragraph 22 of Appellants' statement of facts claims Reagan 
remained in possession of the Kitchen Property and paid rent through August, 1994. 
However, the undisputed fact is that Reagan maintained its sign on the Kitchen Property on 
a month-to-month tenancy from August, 1993 to September 30,1994. On September 13, 
2UDOT regulations require that when a local authority requires a building permit 
for an outdoor advertising sign, one must be obtained before UDOT will issue a permit 
authorizing the erection of the sign. Ut. Admin. Rules R 933-2-4(15). 
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1994 the Kitchens served Reagan with a Notice to Quit. The Notice to Quit informed 
Reagan that the month-to-month tenancy ended September 30,1994. (R.563). Appellants' 
citation to the record to support the factual statements in paragraph 22 do not create a 
question of fact. Appellants cite to a complaint filed in the Underlying Action. This is not 
admissible evidence. Nevertheless, the complaint and its exhibits do not state that Reagan 
remained in possession of the property through August, 1994 (R. 473-483). 
C. Facts Relating to Breach of Standard of Care 
Utah Sign first consulted with Mitchell regarding their intention to cut down 
the Reagan sign prior to doing so. Mitchell strongly advised Utah Sign, through former 
plaintiff Terry Reid, that such action was probably a crime and would be a serious mistake. 
(R. 616-617). Mitchell also informed the Utah Sign plaintiffs, again through Terry Reid, 
that cutting down the sign would provide Reagan basis for claiming punitive damages in a 
civil lawsuit and would taint the entire proceedings in that lawsuit. (R. 617). 
Utah Sign admits that on October 8,1994 it removed the Reagan sign from the 
Kitchen Property. It is important to note that the allegations in Reagan's three original 
complaints were not based upon an actual forcible entry. Rather, the forcible entry claims 
contained in those complaints were based upon Utah Sign's threats to forcibly enter the 
Reagan property. Of particular significance is the representation contained in the complaints 
wherein Reagan alleges "ROA is currently is [sic] peaceable possession of the leased 
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premises and continues to maintain its outdoor advertising sign on the site." (See e.g. 
Addenda 3 and 5). 
Reagan's Amended Complaint in the second-filed Complaint alleged a forcible 
entry claim based on new facts: Utah Sign's illegal removal of Reagan's sign. (See Addenda 
4). The court in the Underlying Action ruled against Utah Sign on the forcible entry issue. 
The court's ruling in the Underlying Action on Reagan's claim of forcible entry highlights 
the central weakness in Appellants' legal malpractice case -- Appellants largely brought 
about their own downfall through the illegal act of cutting down Reagan's sign. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court appropriately granted Mitchell's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the lost sign revenue claim because, as a matter of law, Appellants could not 
have lawfully maintained the sign from which they claimed to have lost revenue. Reagan 
had the lawful right to maintain a sign within 500 feet of where Appellants' desired to locate 
their sign. Because of the 500 foot prohibition contained in Utah's Outdoor Advertising 
Act, Appellants were precluded from erecting and maintaining the sign. 
The trial court correctly denied Utah Sign's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Expert testimony by attorney Gordon Roberts supports Mitchell's tactical 
decisions in the Underlying Action. The trial court's subjective opinion about how it would 




I. MITCHELL DID NOT CAUSE APPELLANTS' LOST SIGN REVENUE 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
It is the plaintiffs' burden in a legal malpractice action to prove not only that 
the attorney was negligent, but that the negligence proximately caused plaintiffs damages. 
Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Ut. App. 1990). 
A finding of such damages could not be properly based on 
speculation or conjecture. They can be awarded only if there is 
a basis in evidence upon which reasonable minds acting fairly 
thereon could believe with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury and damage and also that it wras proximately 
caused by the negligence of the defendant. 
Dunn v. McKay. Burton. McMurray & Thurman. 584 P.2d 394, 896 (Utah 1998). 
This court has held that a plaintiff must establish that but for the attorneys 
negligence, plaintiffs' loss would not have occurred. Kilpatrick v. Wiley Rein & Fielding. 
P.C.. 909 P.2d 1283,1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Additionally, there must be clear, definite 
and reliable evidence showing a direct causal connection between the alleged malpractice 
and damage. "In Utah, causation or connection between fault and damages in legal 
malpractice actions 'cannot properly be based on speculation or conjecture.'" Id. at 1291 
(quoting Dunn. 594 P.2d at 896). 
Summary judgment is appropriate when evidence on causation is undisputed, 
or when a plaintiff does not present the type of evidence necessary to establish a direct 
causal connection between malpractice and actual damages. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 
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433,439 (Utah 1996). See also. Mitchell v. Parsons Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 
1985) (" [Demonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is 
not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes direct 
causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury."). 
The trial court appropriately granted summary judgment on Appellants' lost 
sign revenue claim. There is no evidence any action or inaction by Mitchell caused such 
damages. Neither the Kitchens nor Utah Sign could have lawfully erected the outdoor 
advertising sign on the Kitchen Property from which they claim to have lost revenue. 
B. Law Regulating the Erection of Outdoor Advertising Signs 
The version of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act in effect when Reagan 
obtained relevant UDOT permits appeared at Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.1, et seg. (1989 
& Supp. 1994) ("Outdoor Advertising Act").3 The Outdoor Advertising Act vested the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") with the authority to regulate outdoor advertising 
and to adopt regulatory rules and rules for the administration and enforcement of the 
Outdoor Advertising Act. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.6. The versions of the Outdoor 
Advertising Act and UDOT rules applicable to the claims in this case are reproduced in 
Addendum 1. 
3A11 citations within this brief to the Outdoor Advertising Act and rules are to 
versions in effect through September 30, 1994. In 1998 the Outdoor Advertising Act 
was renumbered effective March 21, 1998 as Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-501, et seg. 
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The provisions of the Outdoor Advertising Act and UDOT rules relevant to 
this case are: 
• A UDOT permit must be obtained prior to the erection of an outdoor 
advertising sign. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.7(1). 
• The Outdoor Advertising Act defines as unlawful the erection of an 
outdoor advertising sign in the absence of a UDOT permit. Utah Code 
Ann. §27-12-136.9. 
• The owner of a conforming outdoor advertising sign may relocate the 
sign upon the granting by UDOT of a written request for such 
relocation. Ut. Admin. Code R 933-2-5(e). 
• No outdoor advertising sign may be erected or maintained within 500 
feet of an existing sign. Ut. Code Ann. § 27-12-136.5(2)(a). 
C. Reagan Had a Valid Permit to Relocate its Sign to the Doctorman 
Property Which Precluded Appellants from Erecting the Sign from 
Which They Claim to Have Lost Revenue 
Appellants raise numerous issues they believe create questions of material fact. 
They do not create questions of material fact. Much of what Appellants raise is 
inconsequential to the grounds upon which summary judgment was based. The legal 
grounds for the summary judgment are clear and straight forward. The material facts are 
few, and remain undisputed. The law and facts are: 
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LAW UNDISPUTED FACT 
No outdoor sign may be erected or Reagan held a UDOT permit to 
maintained without a UDOT -* maintain a sign on the Kitchen 
permit. Property through September 30, 
(U.C.A. § 27-12-136.7(1)) 1994. 
UDOT may authorize relocation of On September 28, 1994 UDOT 
a sign. -* granted Reagan's request to 
(Utah Admin. Code R 933-2- relocate its sign to the Doctorman 
5(e)) Property. 
No sign may be erected or The Kitchen Property is within 500 
maintained within 500 feet of an -> feet of Reagan's sign on the 
existing sign. Doctorman Property. 
(U.C.A. § 27-12-136.5) 
In 1981 UDOT issued to Reagan, as sign owner, a permit to erect and maintain 
an outdoor advertising sign on the Kitchen Property. It is undisputed Reagan had the right 
to occupy the Kitchen Property through September 30,1994. After the initial 20 year term 
of the Reagan Lease expired in August, 1993, Reagan continued to pay rent and maintained 
its sign on the Kitchen Property on a month-to-month basis. The Kitchens did not terminate 
the tenancy until the effective date of September 30, 1994. 
On September 24, 1994, Reagan applied for a permit to relocate its sign 166 
feet south to the Doctorman Property. Reagan's request to relocate the sign was granted on 
September 28, 1994. Reagan thereafter erected a sign on the Doctorman Property. 
It has never been disputed that Reagan's sign on the Doctorman Property is 
less than 500 feet from where Appellants desired to erect a sign (it is approximately 166 
feet). Accordingly, the 500 foot prohibition contained in the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act 
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and UDOT rules adopted pursuant thereto precluded the Kitchens' or Utah Sign from 
obtaining a UDOT permit to lawfully erect a sign on the Kitchen Property. Utah Sign's 
October 10,1994 application for a UDOT permit to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property was 
appropriately denied, for among other reasons, violation of the 500 foot prohibition set forth 
in § 27-12-136.5(2)(a). (R. 323, 329 and 331). 
Had Mitchell obtained a dismissal of the Underlying Action, as Appellants' 
claim he should have, Appellants still would have been precluded from erecting a sign on 
the Kitchen Property. The issues in the Underlying Action were not whether Reagan could 
lawfully maintain its sign on the Kitchen Property through September 30,1994, but whether 
Reagan had renewed the Reagan Lease for an additional 20 year term and whether Utah 
Sign's cutting down of the Reagan Sign constituted forcible entry entitling Reagan to a 
damage award. (R. 320-323, 473-483, 945-950). 
D. Reagan's UDOT Permit Authorizing the Relocation of its Sign was Valid 
Appellants challenge on several grounds the validity of Reagan's UDOT 
permit to relocate its sign. All challenges are unavailing. First, appellant's fail to appreciate 
that in support of his motion Mitchell introduced UDOT records including the relocation 
permit, and the testimony of UDOT permit officer to lay the foundation for the records. 
Reagan's permit to relocate the sign is valid on its face. Appellants have produced no 
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evidence that UDOT, or a Utah District Court on review, ever adjudicated Reagan's permit 
to be invalid.4 
Notwithstanding the absence of evidence disputing the validity of Reagan's 
UDOT permit, each of Appellants challenges to the validity of the permit fails on the merits. 
First, Appellants argue Reagan had no right to apply for a permit to relocate its sign because 
from August, 1993 Reagan was occupying the Kitchen Property on a month-to-month 
tenancy. Appellants argue that because UDOT permits are issued for a one year term, if a 
sign owner does not have a lease for a term of at least one year the sign owner is not entitled 
to renew its permit. This is incorrect. UDOT rules require that an applicant file written 
proof of a lease or consent from a sign owner to erect the sign at the time of the application 
for an original permit. The rules do not require that the lease be for a specified term. The 
rules further state that at the time of subsequent renewals of the permit, the applicant must 
merely certify that the sign site is still under a valid lease. It does not require that the lease 
be for any specified term. Ut. Admin. Code R. 933-2-4(11).5 
4Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.9(4) provides that the district courts shall have 
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final orders of UDOT under the Outdoor 
Advertising Act resulting from formal or informal adjudicative proceedings. 
5R. 933-2-4 reads in full: 
(11) Written proof of a lease or consent from site owner to 
erect or maintain an outdoor advertising sign must be 
furnished by the applicant at the time of application for an 
original permit. This proof may consist of an affidavit 
showing the landowner's name and address, the owner's 
name, and the sign location by route, mile post, address, and 
-15-
It remains undisputed that for over one year before Reagan applied for the 
permit to relocate its sign, Reagan was lawfully maintaining its sign on the Kitchen Property 
under a month-to-month tenancy. This month-to-month tenancy was terminated by the 
Kitchens effective September 30,1994. Accordingly, on September 24,1994 when Reagan 
applied for the relocation permit Reagan had a lawful right to do so - - which application 
UDOT granted on September 28, 1994. 
Second, Appellants argue that Reagan was precluded from obtaining the 
UDOT relocation permit because on September 2, 1994 Utah Sign received a South Salt 
Lake City building permit which Utah Sign claims allowed it to erect a sign on the Kitchen 
Property.6 This argument is erroneous. First, whether or not the South Salt Lake City 
building permit issued to Utah Sign was valid, it did not entitle Utah Sign to erect a sign on 
the Kitchen Property. A UDOT permit is required before an outdoor advertising sign can 
county. On renewal of the permit the applicant must certify 
that the sign site is still under valid lease to the applicant. 
Ut. Admin. Code R 933-2-411. 
6The South Salt Lake City building permit did not actually authorize Utah Sign to 
erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Kitchen property. The application submitted by 
Utah Sign states that only a "new face on existing sign" would be erected. Of course, the 
existing sign was not Utah Sign's sign, but Reagan's sign. When South Salt Lake City 
became aware that Utah Sign had cut down Reagan's sign and erected a new structure, it 
revoked the building permit issued to Utah Sign because the work went beyond the scope 
applied for in the permit. (R. 565, 689). Appellants are correct in pointing out that 
thereafter South Salt Lake lifted the stop order it had placed on the erection of the sign 
pursuant to the revocation of the building permit. However, the "validity" of the South 
Salt Lake City building permit is completely immaterial to whether or not Reagan had a 
valid UDOT permit to relocate its sign to the Doctorman Property. 
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be erected. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.7(1). It is unlawful to erect a sign without a 
UDOT permit. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.9. The supremacy of the Outdoor Advertising 
Act and UDOT permits over building permits issued by local authorities is made clear in Ut. 
Admin. Code R. 933-2-5(16) which reads: 
Where local authority has issued a building permit for 
construction of a sign, but such construction is contrary to the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, the action of the local authority 
does not require the State to issue a permit. 
Similarly, because holding a South Salt Lake City building permit did not 
entitle Utah Sign to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property, Reagan was not precluded by 
reason of the 500 foot prohibition from obtaining a UDOT permit to relocate its sign. At 
the time Reagan obtained the permit there was no other sign on the Kitchen Property or any 
other property within 500 feet of Reagan's sign. No one, including the Kitchens and Utah 
Sign, had a UDOT permit authorizing it to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property or any place 
within 500 feet of where Reagan relocated its sign on the Doctorman Property. 
Next, there is no factual or legal basis for Appellants' claim that the South Salt 
Lake City building permit issued to Reagan authorizing the relocation of its sign was or is 
invalid because Reagan "misrepresented' that the sign on the Kitchen Property "would come 
down." First, appellants present no admissible evidence of any misrepresentation by Reagan 
to South Salt Lake City. The portion of the record cited to by Appellants in their brief does 
not contain such evidence. The fact that Reagan may have represented to South Salt Lake 
City that its sign on the Kitchen Property would come down when it relocated its sign to the 
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Doctorman Property is entirely reasonable. Reagan had been notified that its tenancy on the 
Kitchen Property would end at the end of September, 1994; hence the reason for the 
application to relocate the sign to the Doctorman Property. However, before Reagan had 
the opportunity to remove its sign, on October 8,1994 Utah Sign cut down the Reagan sign 
approximately three feet from the foundation of the structure and welded a Utah Sign face 
to the remaining structure. Therefore, Reagan's sign did "come down". The sign that 
remained on the Kitchen Property after Reagan obtained the South Salt Lake City permit 
was erected by Utah Sign, not Reagan.7 
Finally, there is no validity to Appellants' claim that Mitchell's alleged failure 
to timely dispose of the Underlying Action prevented Utah Sign from obtaining a UDOT 
permit to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property. First, Appellants fail to state how Mitchell's 
alleged failure in this regard prevented Utah Sign from obtaining a UDOT permit. 
In any event, the Underlying Action Mitchell allegedly perpetuated does not 
create a question of material fact. The dispute in the Underlying Action was whether 
Reagan had exercised its option to renew the lease for another 20 year term, not whether 
Reagan was lawfully occupying the Kitchen Property on a month-to-month basis after the 
expiration of the original 20 year lease term. It is undisputed that from August, 1993 
Notwithstanding the absence of a valid UDOT permit, under the terms of a 
temporary restraining order issued in the Underlying Action the Utah Sign sign remained 
erected pending further litigation. (R. 646-648). 
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through September 30, 1994 Reagan's sign remained on the Kitchen Property under a 
month-to-month tenancy. 
The Underlying Action allegedly perpetuated by Mitchell had no bearing on 
the fact on September 28, 1994 UDOT granted Reagan's request to relocate its sign to the 
Doctorman Property. Finally, the dispute Mitchell allegedly perpetuated had no bearing on 
the fact that because the Reagan's sign on the Doctorman Property was within 500 feet of 
the Kitchen Property, no person or entity, including the Kitchens and Utah Sign, could have 
lawfully erected a sign on the Kitchen Property.10 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED UTAH SIGN'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Expert Testimony by Attorney Gordon Roberts Supports Mitchell's 
Tactical Decisions in the Underlying Case 
Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment fundamentally 
misconstrued the nature of summary judgment and the bases for summary judgment on a 
legal malpractice claim. The only element of a legal malpractice claim established by 
Appellants was the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Appellants and 
Mitchell. Appellants wholly failed to show that Mitchell breached his duty of care to 
Appellants that Mitchell proximately caused them any damage. 
10Ironically, given the Appellants' malpractice claim, Mitchell prevailed at the trial 
court level on the lease dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment declaring that 
Reagan failed to exercise its option to renew the lease of the Kitchen Property for another 
20 year term. Mitchell could not have obtained a more favorable result for Appellants on 
the lease dispute. (R. 868-871). 
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Appellants' brief omits expert testimony in support of its breach of duty 
argument11. Without such testimony Appellants' legal malpractice claim must fail. Preston 
& Chambers v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1997). In Preston & Chambers this court 
confirmed that in order to prevail on all but the most obvious malpractice claims, a plaintiff 
must provide expert testimony on the applicable standard of care. 
In opposing Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mitchell 
relied upon the expert testimony of attorney Gordon Roberts. Mr. Roberts reviewed the 
pleadings, discovery materials and correspondence from the underlying case ROA 
Advertising, Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen, et al. It is Mr. Roberts' opinion that in connection 
with the Rule 41(a) issue, neither Mitchell nor Burbidge and Mitchell committed a breach 
of the applicable standard of care which resulted in any damage to Appellants. Mr. Roberts 
opines that Mitchell's tactical decision not to file a Rule 41(a) motion was sound for the 
following reasons: 
a. A Rule 41(a) motion would not have succeeded in dismissing 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising's ("Reagan's") claim for actual forcible entry because 
the forcible entry claim was a new claim not raised in Reagan's earlier-filed cases. 
b. Reagan's claim against Appellants for breach of lease was 
invalid, as witnessed by the fact the trial court eventually granted the Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by Mitchell on that claim. In granting summary judgment 
nUtah Sign has apparently abandoned the purported expert testimony of attorney 
John Alex, filed in supplement to their original motion papers. R. 714-718). 
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the court held that Reagan's lease had terminated. More importantly, the Motion for 
Summary Judgment achieved the same result with regard to the breach of lease claim 
that Appellants would have achieved by filing a Rule 41(a) motion. It is rank 
speculation to suggest that the summary judgment strategy was more costly than the 
Rule 41(a) strategy. 
c. Mitchell reasonably believed that a Rule 41 (a) motion would not 
succeed because the trial court was unlikely to dismiss Reagan's claims with 
prejudice without Reagan having had an opportunity to litigate its claims, especially 
in light of the forcible entry. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment. 
d. Mitchell reasonably believed that Judge Rigtrup, before whom the case 
was then pending, would be less receptive than Judge Young to Appellants' claims 
because of Judge Rigtrup's obvious displeasure at Utah Sign's forcible entry upon 
the Kitchen leasehold interest. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment. 
(R. 629-632, See Addendum 2). 
Appellants' argument that this is a res ipsa loquitur cast and requires no expert 
witness testimony does not stand scrutiny. As the affidavit of Gordon Roberts makes clear, 
Mitchell's decision to seek consolidation of the last two actions with the first-filed action 
was a reasonable professional judgment under the circumstances. Whether to file a Rule 
41(a) motion in the Underlying Case was a tactical decision. Where there are factual 
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questions related to a tactical or judgmental issue, expert testimony is required. Walker v. 
Bangs, 601 P.2d 1279 (Wa. 1279). 
The Walker court held that in a malpractice action involving allegations of 
negligence against attorneys in their handling of a longshore man's maritime personal injury 
action in federal court, expert legal testimony was both proper and necessary where the case 
involved allegations of negligence pertaining to trial tactics and procedure. The court also 
commented that these were matters frequently difficult to prove. Id. at 1282. 
Even if expert testimony were not required, Appellants' motion would fail. 
Appellants reason that because Reagan voluntarily dismissed two of the actions it filed 
against Appellants, the remaining action would have automatically been dismissed with 
prejudice had they filed a Rule 41(a) motion. Appellants are wrong for reasons stated in the 
very cases they rely upon in their brief. 
In Englehart v. Bell & Howell Co., 299 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1962) the court 
discusses the appropriate remedy to obtain relief from the effect of a second voluntary 
dismissal: moving to set aside or vacate such dismissal. Id. at 484, citing United States v. 
Beebe. 180 U.S. 343, 21 S. Ct. 371 (1901); Preveden v. Hahn. 36 F. Supp. 952 (SDNY 
1941) and Levee District No. 4 of Dunklin County v. Small, 281 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App. 
1955). One of the cases relied upon by Appellants makes the same observation. The court 
in Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317 (1987) stated that the district court has power 
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to vacate a voluntary dismissal under Rule 60(b) as long as requisite justification exists, 
especially where the vacation of dismissal does not unduly prejudice a party. 
In Randall plaintiff filed two complaints against Merrill Lynch and voluntarily 
dismissed both of them. Plaintiff, who was certified as fully disabled by the state of 
California, dismissed the two complaints because his doctor warned him that the stress 
caused by the cases could result in serious physiological consequences such as a heart attack, 
or stroke. After plaintiff filed a third complaint, Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss pursuant 
to Rule 41(a), which motion was granted. The court held that although plaintiffs second 
voluntary dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits, plaintiffs could seek to vacate 
that dismissal pursuant to Rule 60. Id. at 1320. 
Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Vacate the second dismissal. Although the 
plaintiffs motion did not fall within Rule 60(b)(l)-60(b)(5), the court considered Rule 
60(b)(6), which allows relief to a party from a final judgment for any reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The court decided dismissal of the complaints was not 
a calculated strategic decision, but rather the result of an extreme circumstance (the 
plaintiffs severe illness) beyond the plaintiff s control, which justified relieving the plaintiff 
from the judgment. Id. at 1321. citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198,71 
S. 0.209,212(1950). 
In this case there is no evidence contained in the record as to the basis for 
Reagan's decision to dismiss its first and third complaints. Because a factual void exists as 
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to the bases of those dismissals, it is possible that Reagan could have moved to reinstate one 
of its previously dismissed cases and thereby avoided the effect of Rule 41(a) (even if Rule 
41(a) applied to Reagan's claim for actual forcible entry). Mitchell testified that one of the 
reasons he did not think a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a) would be effective 
against Reagan was because, even if granted, Reagan could simply move to have one of its 
previously filed actions reinstated. Mitchell did not think the Third District Court would in 
effect give Reagan the "death penalty" by dismissing its claims against the Utah Sign 
plaintiffs with prejudice. Mitchell also believed that a Rule 41 (a) motion would fail on legal 
ground inasmuch as — after Utah Sign forcibly entered the Reagan leasehold — Reagan had 
a new claim that had not been alleged in the earlier cases. (R. 618-619). 
In Poloron Products, Inc. v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F. 2d 
1012, 1017 (2nd Cir. 1976) the court observed: 
The "two dismissal" rule is an exception to the general 
principle, contained in Rule 41(a)(1) and honored in equity 
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules that a voluntary 
dismissal of an action does not bar a new suit based upon the 
same claim. 5 J.Moore, supra, para. 41.04, at 1045. Where the 
purpose behind the "two dismissal" exception would not appear 
to be served by its literal application, and where that 
application's effect would be to close the courthouse doors to 
an otherwise proper litigant, a court should be most careful not 
to construe or apply the exception too broadly. 
Mitchell's tactical decision to seek consolidation as opposed to dismissal is 
consistent with the Poloron court's stricture about limiting the application of Rule 41(a). 
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Rule 41(a) requires that for purposes of dismissal with prejudice, the same 
claim must have been twice voluntarily dismissed. Wright and Miller observe: 
There is surprisingly little discussion in the cases of what is "the 
same claim" for purposes of Rule 41(a). . . Since the effect of 
finding two dismissals to have been on the same claim is to 
make the second dismissal an adjudication on the merits and 
thus preclude a later suit in which the merits actually will be 
tried, the courts should not extend the words "same claim" 
beyond their natural meaning. 
Wright and Miller § 2368, p. 329, citing Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, Inc., 96 So. 2d 
215, 218 (Fla. 1957). 
In Crump, plaintiffs had first filed and dismissed two suits for an injunction 
questioning the authority and good faith of corporate directors in proposing to issue unissued 
stock and to increase the membership of the board. Plaintiffs next filed a suit alleging fraud 
and mismanagement on the part of the managing director of a corporation, and praying for 
an accounting, a receivership, and a dissolution of the corporation. The Crump court found 
that this was not the same as the first two causes of action, "since the facts necessary to the 
maintenance of [the third] suit are not essentially the same as those which would have been 
relied upon to establish the right to the relief prayed for in the first suit." Id. at 218, citing 
Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952). The court concluded "certainly as to these 
aspects of the third suit, the voluntary dismissal of the first suit cannot operate under the two 
dismissal rule as a bar to the third suit." Id. 
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This case involves facts very similar to those in Crump. Reagan filed three 
suits stating a cause of action for anticipated forcible entry upon its premises, based upon 
correspondence received from Utah Sign's counsel. However, after Utah Sign illegally cut 
down Reagan's sign in October, 1994, Reagan's forcible entry cause of action changed. The 
actual forcible entry claim was not the same claim as the anticipatory claim contained in the 
original three suits. This is best evidenced by Reagan's Amended Complaint in the second 
filed suit, which specifically pleads the facts of Utah Sign's actual forcible entry and a cause 
of action based on those facts. (See Addendum 4). 
Appellants argue that Rule 41(a)'s adjudication upon the merits "is dispositive, 
not only of the claims actually brought in the dismissed actions but those issues and claims 
that could have been litigated as well." (Appellants' Brief at 12, citing Searle Brothers v. 
Searie, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). Appellants ignore the fact that Rule 41(a) makes 
no mention whatsoever of adjudicating claims "that could have been litigated." Rather, 
41(a) adjudicates upon the merits "an action based on or including the same claim." 
Appellants' argument conflates two very different juridical principles: the specific, narrow 
statutory enactment of Rule 41(a) and the broad common law principle of res judicata. 
As argued supra. Rule 41(a) should be strictly construed since it is in 
derogation of a previously existing right. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to expand 
Rule 41(a)'s scope to issues and claims "that could have been litigated" in voluntarily 
dismissed actions. Dismissal of Reagan's first and third-filed suits could not have triggered 
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Rule 41(a) because Reagan's Amended Complaint in the second-filed suit was not based on 
the same facts driving the original three suits. 
Appellants' conclusory, unsupported statements about what Mitchell should 
have done constitute nothing more than disagreement about litigation tactics. Courts have 
recognized that attorneys are not liable for legal malpractice where the proper course is open 
to reasonable doubt. See e.g., Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co., P.C., 160 A.D. 2d 428, 554 
N.Y.S.2d487(1990). 
B. The Trial Court's Subjective Opinion About How it Would Have Ruled 
if Presented With Certain Facts in the Underlying Case is Irrelevant and 
Inadmissible 
Utah Sign claims: 
The trial court, when belatedly presented with a motion brought 
under [Rule 41a] after Mitchell's termination and replacement 
in the case, recognized the simplicity and efficacy of the rule 
and acknowledged that he would have implemented its 
provisions and dismissed the R.O.A. claims but for Mitchells 
[sic] own conduct in seeking reinstatement and consolidation 
of the dismissed complaint thereby negligently subjecting his 
clients to litigation of barred claims. (Quotation omitted). 
(Utah's Sign's Brief, p. 14, emphasis in original). 
For purposes of proving proximate cause in a legal malpractice case the 
plaintiff must objectively show that absent the attorney's negligence, the underlying action 
would have been successful. In Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) the Utah 
Supreme Court explained this means establishing what the result of the underlying action 
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should have been, which is an objective standard, rather than what a particular judge or jury 
would have decided, which is a subjective standard. 
In Harline, the defendant attorneys successfully argue that they were not the 
proximate cause of plaintiff Harline's denial of discharge in bankruptcy. The Supreme 
Court held that the Bankruptcy Court's determination that Harline had acted fraudulently 
and should be denied discharge precluded Harline from relitigating the cause of his denial 
of discharge in the malpractice action. However, in so ruling, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the trial court erred in admitting subjective opinion testimony from the bankruptcy judge 
who presided over the original case as to how that judge would have ruled absent the alleged 
negligence of the defendant attorney.12 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Harline v. Barker makes clear that 
Appellants' attempted use of the trial court's subjective opinion is in the Underlying Action 
improper. Such evidence would be irrelevant and inadmissible at trial and was properly 
disregarded by the court in considering Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
12The Utah Supreme Court also held that admission of the subjective opinion 
testimony was harmless error where plaintiff failed to show that the defendant attorney 
caused plaintiff's denial of discharge in the underlying bankruptcy cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision granting appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denying appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this25 day of January, 2002. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
KIRK G. GIBBS 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
-29-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this day of 
January, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, to the 
following: 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Appellants/Plaintiffs 
P.O.Box 173 
Fish Haven, ID 83287 f k io^ 
Tabl 
UTAH OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ACT 
27-12-136.4 HIGHWAYS 
(24) (a) "Unzoned commercial or industrial area" means: 
(i) those areas not zoned by state law or local law, regulation, 
or ordinance tha t are occupied by one or more industrial or 
commercial activities other than outdoor advertising signs; 
(ii) the lands along the highway for a distance of 600 feet 
immediately adjacent to those activities; and 
(iii) lands covering the same dimensions that are directly 
opposite those activities on the other side of the highway, if the 
department determines that those lands on the opposite side of 
the highway do not have scenic or aesthetic value. 
(b) In measuring the scope of the unzoned commercial or industrial 
area, all measurements shall be made from the outer edge of the 
regularly used buildings, parking lots, storage, or processing areas of 
the activities and shall be along or parallel to the edge of pavement of 
the highway. 
• (c) All signs located within an unzoned commercial or industrial 
area become nonconforming if the commercial or industrial activity 
used in defining the area ceases for a continuous period of 12 months. 
(25) "Urbanized county" means a county with a population of at least 
125,000 persons. 
H i s t o r y : L- 1967, ch . 51 , § 3; 1971, c h . 6 1 , A m e n d m e n t No tes . — The 1994 amend-
§ 2; 1981, ch . 136, § 1; 1988, ch . 239, § 1; ment, effective May 2, 1994, corrected the ref-
1988 (2nd S.S.), c h . 5, § 1; 1994, c h . 12, § 26. erences in Subsection (4). 
27-12-136.4. Advertising prohibited near interstate or 
primary sys tem — Exceptions — Logo advertis-
ing — Permits required in certain cases — De-
partment rules. 
(1) Outdoor advertising tha t is capable of being read or comprehended from 
any place on the main-traveled way of an interstate or primary system may not 
be erected or maintained, except: 
(a) directional and other official signs and notices authorized or re-
quired by law, including signs and notices pertaining to natural wonders 
and scenic and historic attractions, informational or directional signs 
regarding utility service, emergency telephone signs, buried or under-
ground utility markers, and above ground utility closure signs; 
(b) signs advertising the sale or lease of property upon which they are 
located; 
(c) signs advertising activities conducted on the property where they 
are located; 
(d) signs located in a commercial or industrial zone; 
(e) signs located in unzoned industrial or commercial areas as deter-
mined from actual land uses; and 
(f) logo advertising under Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) The department may itself or by contract erect, administer, and 
maintain informational signs on the main-traveled way of an interstate or 
primary system for the display of logo advertising and information of 
interest to the traveling public if: 
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HIGHWAY CODE 27-12-1; 
(I) the department complies with Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah J 
curement Code, in the lease or other contract agreement wit 
private party for the sign or sign space; and 
(ii) the private party for the lease of the sign or sign space payg 
amount set by the department to be paid to the department or 
party under contract with the department under this subsection. 
(b) The amount shall be sufficient to cover the costs of erecti 
administering, and maintaining the signs or sign spaces. 
(c) The department may consult the Division of Travel Developmem 
carrying out this subsection. 
(3) (a) Revenue generated under Subsection (2) shall be: 
(i) applied first to cover department costs under Subsection (2); a 
(ii) deposited in the Transportation Fund, 
(b) Revenue in excess of costs under Subsection (2)(a) shall be deposil 
in the General Fund as a dedicated credit for use by the Division of Tra 
Development no later than the following fiscal year. 
(4) Outdoor advertising under Subsections (l)(a), (d), (e), and (f) sh 
conform to the rules made by the department under Sections 27-12-136.6 a 
27-12-136.7. 
H i s t o r y : L. 1967, ch. 51 , § 4; 1971, ch. 61 , The 1991 amendment, effective April 
§ 3; 1981, ch . 136, § 2; 1989, ch- 144, § 1; 1991, substituted "commission* for "depa 
1991, ch . 137, § 47; 1994, ch . 120, § 39. ment" a t the end of Subsection (4) and ma 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1989 amend- stylistic and punctuation changes in Subsi 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsec- tions (l)Ca) and (2)(a). 
tions (lXf), (2) and (3) relating to logo advertis- The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,19$ 
ing; designated former Subsection (2) as (4) and substituted "Code" for "Act" in Subsecti 
rewrote the subsection which read. "Outdoor (2)(a)(i), subdivided Subsection (3)(a); in Su 
advertising authorized under Subsections section (3)(a), substituted "Subsection (2)H f 
(l)(a), (d), and (e) of this section shall conform "Subsection (2)(a)" twice; substituted "depai 
to the s tandards and bear permits as required ment" for "commission" and added the secti< 
by regulations promulgated by the depart- citations in Subsection (4); and made stylist 
ment"; and made numerous stylistic changes. changes. 
27-12-136.5. Sign size — Sign spacing — Location in oiil 
door advertising corridor — Limit on implemen 
tation. 
(1) Sign size: 
(a) No sign face within the state shall exceed the following limits: 
(i) maximum area — 1000 square feet; 
(ii) maximum length — 60 feet; and 
(iii) maximum height — 25 feet. 
(b) No more than two facings visible and readable from the sami 
direction on the main-traveled way may be erected on any one sigi 
structure. Whenever two facings are so positioned, neither shall exceec 
325 square feet. 
(c; Double-faced, back-to-back, and V-type signs are permitted as £ 
single sign or structure if both faces enjoy common ownership. 
(2) Sign spacing: 
(a) Any sign allowed to be erected by reason of the exceptions set forth 
in Subsection 27-12-136.4(1) or in H-l zones shall not be closer than 50C 
feet to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway oi 
limited access primary highway, except that signs may be erected closer 
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27-12-136.5 HIGHWAYS 
than 500 feet if the signs on the same side of the interstate highway
 0 r 
limited access primary highway are not simultaneously visible. 
(b) Signs may not be located within 500 feet of any of the following 
which are adjacent to the highway, unless the signs are in an incorporated 
area: 
(i) public parks; 
(ii) public forests; 
(hi) public playgrounds; 
(iv) areas designated as scenic areas by the department or other 
state agency having and exercising this authority; or 
(v) cemeteries. 
(c) (i) Except under Subsection (ii), signs may not be located on an 
interstate highway or limited access highway on the primary system 
within 500 feet of an interchange, or intersection at grade, or rest area 
• measured along the interstate highway or freeway from the sign to 
the nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at 
the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way. 
(ii) A sign may be placed closer than 500 feet from the nearest point 
of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or 
entrance to the main-traveled way, if: 
(A) the sign is at least 500 feet but not more than 2,640 feet 
from the nearest point of the intersecting highway of the inter-
change; and 
(B) the section of interstate highway or freeway was opened for 
use by the traveling public on or after September 1, 1987. 
(d) The location of signs situated on nonlimited access primary high-
ways in commercial, industrial, or H-l zoned areas between streets, roads, 
or highways entering the primary highway shall not exceed the following 
minimum spacing criteria: 
(i) Where the distance between centerlines of intersecting streets, 
roads, or highways is less than 1000 feet, a minimum spacing between 
structures of 150 feet may be permitted between the intersecting 
streets or highways. 
(ii) Where the distance between centerlines of intersecting streets, 
roads, or highways is 1000 feet or more, minimum spacing between 
sign structures shall be 300 feet. 
(e) All outdoor advertising shall be erected and maintained within the 
outdoor advertising corridor. 
(3) Subsection (2)(c)(ii) may not be implemented until: 
(a) the Utah-Federal Agreement for carrying out national policy rela-
tive to control of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the national 
system of interstate and defense highways and the federal-aid primary 
system is modified to allow the sign placement specified in Subsection 
(2)(c)(ii); and 
(b) the modified agreement under Subsection (a) is signed on behalf of 
both the state and the United States Secretary of Transportation. 
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 5; 1971, ch. 61, tion designation (2)(c)(i) and substituted aEx-
§ 4; 1981, ch. 136, § 3; 1989, ch. 144, § 2; cept under Subsection (2)(c)(n), signs may not" 
1991, ch. 137, § 48. for "No sign may* at the beginning thereof, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- added Subsections (2XcXn) and (3), and made 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted subsec- stylistic changes. 
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The 1991 amendment, effective April 2S, reference m Subsection (2)(a) and mad 
991, deleted M(d) or (e)* in the subsection changes m punctuation and phraseology. 
57-12-136.6. Advertising — Regulatory power of depart 
ment. 
In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
^ct, the department may make rules no more restrictive than this chapter to 
(1) control the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising alon§ 
the interstate and primary highway systems; 
(2) provide for enforcement of this chapter; 
(3) establish the form, content, and submittal of applications to ered 
outdoor advertising; and 
(4) establish administrative procedures. 
History; L. 1967, ch. 51, § 6; 1971, ch- 61, sistent with and no more restrictive than" aftei 
i 5; 1981, ch. 136, § 4; 1990, ch. 300, § 2; "systems" in Subsection CD; added "provide foi 
L991, ch. 137, § 49; 1994, ch. 120, § 40. enforcement oP at the beginning of Subsection 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- (2); and added Subsections (3) and (4) 
nent, effective April 23, 1990, divided the for- The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
nerly undivided language into an introductory 199iy substituted "commission" for "depart-jaragraph and Subsections (1) and (2); rewrote
 ment" and made a minor stylistic change. 
,he introductory paragraph which read "The
 T h e 1 9 9 4 a m e n d m e n t j effective May 2,1994, 
iepartment is hereby authorized to make and
 s u b s t l t u t e d "department" for "commission" m 
promulgate regulations to deleted signs dis-
 t h e m t r o d u c t o i y i a n g u a g e . 
plays, and devices after advertising and con-
27-12-136.7, Advertising. — Permits — Application re-
quirements — Duration — Fees, 
(1) (a) Outdoor advertising may not be maintained without a current 
permit. 
(b) Applications for permits shall be made to the department on forms 
furnished by it. 
(c) A permit must be' obtained prior to installing each outdoor sign. 
(d) The application for a permit shall be accompanied by an initial fee 
established under Section 63-38-3.2. 
(2) (a) Each permit issued by the department expires on June 30 of each 
year. 
(b) Each permit may be renewed for a period of one year upon the filing 
of a renewal application and payment of a renewal fee established under 
Section 63-38-3.2. 
(3) Sign owners residing outside the state shall provide the department with 
a continuous performance bond in the amount of $2,500. 
(4) Fees may not be prorated for fractions of the permit period. Advertising 
copy may be changed at any time without payment of an additional fee. 
(5) (a) Each sign shall have its permit continuously affixed to the sign in a 
position visible from the nearest traveled portion of the highway. 
(b) The permit shall be affixed to the sign within 30 days of the 
installation date. 
History: L. 1987, ch. 51, § 7; 1971, ch. 51, Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
§ 6; 1981, ch. 136, § 5; 1990, ch. 300, § 3; ment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, subdivided the 
1991, ch. 137, ^ 50; 1994, ch. 120, § 41. section; rewrote Subsection (l)(a); substituted 
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"Department of Transportation" for "depait- section (6), and rewrote Subjection (7), which 
ment" in Subsection (l)(b), inserted "outdoor" in read "Signs lawfully in place on the effective 
Subsection (l)(c); in Subsection (l)(d), added date of this act shall have permits continuously 
the second sentence and substituted the Ian- displayed thereon " 
guage beginning "determined by rule" for "of The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
$15" in the first sentence, deleted a following 1991, substituted "department" for "Depart-
paragraph, relating to the validity of permits, ment of Transportation" in Subsections (l)(b), 
substituted "permit issued by the Department (2)(a), (3) and (5), substituted "commission" for 
of Transportation expires" for "annual permit "Department of Transportation" in Subsections 
issued by the department shall expire" in Sub- (l)(d) and (2)(b), and made minor stylistic 
section (2)(a), in Subsection (2)(b), added the changes 
second sentence and substituted the phrase The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
beginning "renewal fee determined by rule" for substituted "prior to installing" for "for" m 
M$5 renewal fee" m the first sentence; substi- Subsection (l)(c), replacing the provisions of 
tuted "residing outside the state shall provide deleted Subsection (6), substituted "established 
the Department of Transportation" for "located under Section 63-38-3 2" for "determined by 
outside the s ta te of Utah must provide the rule of the commission in accordance with Title 
department" in Subsection (3); made minor 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
stylistic changes in Subsection (4); substituted Rulemaking Act The fee shall be reasonable 
"Department of Transportation" for "depart- and fair and shall reflect the cost of the service 
ment" and "installation" for "erection" and provided" in Subsections (l)(d) and (2)(b), and 
made stylistic changes in Subsection (5), sub- rewrote Subsection (5) to incorporate deleted 
s t i tuted "installation" for "construction" in Sub- Subsection (7) 
27-12-136.8. Repealed. 
R e p e a l s . — Laws 1990, ch. 300, § 5 repeals ch 136, § 6, relating to notice of a violation to 
§ 27-12-136.8, as last amended by Laws 1981, the holder of a permit, effective April 23, 1990 
27-12-136.9. Unlawful outdoor advertising — Adjudica-
tive proceedings — Judicial review — Costs of 
removal — Civil and criminal liability for dam-
aging regulated signs — Immunity for Depart-
ment of Transportation. 
(1) Outdoor advertising is unlawful when: 
(a) erected after May 9, 1967, contrary to the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) a permit is not obtained as required by this chapter; 
(c) a false or misleading statement has been made in the application for 
a permit that was material to obtaining the permit; or 
(d) the sign for which a permit was issued is not in a reasonable state 
of repair, is unsafe, or is otherwise in violation of this chapter. 
(2) The establishment, operation, repair, maintenance, or alteration of any 
sign contrary to this chapter is also a public nuisance. 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (4), in its enforcement of this section, 
the Department of Transportation shall comply with the procedures and 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act. 
(4) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final orders of the Department of Transportation under this section 
resulting from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of final orders of the Department of 
Transportation shall be in the county in which the sign is located. 
(5) If the Department of Transportation is granted a judgment, the Depart-
ment of Transportation is entitled to have any nuisance abated and recover 
from the responsible person, firm, or corporation, jointly and severally: 
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the sign; and 
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(b) $10 for each day the sign was maintained following the expirat 
ten days after notice of agency action was filed and served under Si 
63-46b-3. 
(6) (a) Any person, partnership, firm, or corporation who vandalizes, 
ages, defaces, destroys, or uses any sign controlled under this ch 
without the owner's permission is liable to the owner of the sign for \ 
the amount of damage sustained and all costs of court, includ 
reasonable attorney's fee, and is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(b) This subsection does not apply to the department, its agen 
employees if acting to enforce this chapter. 
His to ry : L. 1967, ch. 51, § 9,- 1971, ch. 61, and, in tha t subsection, added "Except s 
§ 8; 1981, ch . 136, § 7; 1987, ch. 161, § 67; vided m Subsection (4), in its enforcem 
1990, ch . 300, 5 4. this section" at the beginning and subst 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1990 amend- "the Administrative Procedures Act" for 
ment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, substituted adjudicative proceedings"; substituted p 
present Subsections (l)(c) and (lXd) for former Subsection (4) for former Subsection (3), 
Subsection (lXc), which read "when a permittee mg to the same subject matter, and d 
fails to comply with a notice of violation as former Subsection (4); inserted present Si 
provided m Section 27-12-136 8," and rewrote tion (5); redesignated former Subsection 
the remaining language in Subsection (1); in- present Subsection (6); and substituted 
serted present Subsection (2); redesignated for- section does not" for "paragraph shall u 
mer Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3) construed to" in Subsection (6)(b). 
27-12-136.10. Existing outdoor advertising not in coni 
mity with act — When removal required. 
Any outdoor advertising lawfully in existence along the interstate or 
primary systems on the effective date of this act and which is not the 
conformity with its provisions is not required to be removed until five y< 
after it becomes nonconforming or pursuant to the provisions of Sec 
27-12-136.11. 
His to ry : L. 1967, ch. 5 1 , 4 10; 1981, ch. ment, effective April 27,1992, deleted u; ex 
136, § 8; 1992, ch. 30, § 60. for violations of Section 27-12-136.8" afteru 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1992 amend- conforming." 
27-12-136.11. Existing outdoor advertising not in conf 
mity with act — Procedure — Eminent domain 
Compensation. 
(1) The department is hereby empowered and authorized to acquire by g 
purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent -domain, any existing outd 
advertising and all property rights pertaining to same which were lawfull} 
existence on May 9, 1967, and which by reason of this chapter beco 
nonconforming.' If the department, or any town, city, county, governmen 
entity, public utility, or any agency or the United States Department 
Transportation under this chapter, prevents the maintenance as defined 
Section 27-12-136.3 or requires that maintenance of an existing sign 
discontinued, the sigh in question shall be considered acquired by such ent 
and just compensation will become immediately due and payable. Emin( 




(2) Jus t compensation shall be paid for outdoor advertising and all property 
rights pertaining to the same, including the right of the landowner upon whose 
land a sign is located, acquired through the processes of eminent domain. For 
the purposes of this act, just compensation shall include the consideration of 
damages to remaining-properties, contiguous and noncontiguous, of an outdoor 
advertising sign company's interest, which remaining properties, together 
with the properties actually condemned, constituted an economic unit. The 
department is empowered to remove signs found in violation of Section 
27-12-136.9 without payment of any compensation. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to permit a person to place or 
maintain any outdoor advertising adjacent to any interstate or primary, 
highway system which is prohibited by law or by any town, city, or county 
ordinance. Any town, city, county, governmental entity, or public utility which 
requires the removal, relocation, alteration, change, or termination of outdoor 
advertising shall pay jus t compensation as defined in this chapter and in Title 
78, Chapter 34. 
Except as provided in Section 27-12-136.9, no sign shall be required to be 
removed by' the department nor sign maintenance as described in Section 
27-12-136.11 discontinued unless at the time of removal or discontinuance 
there are sufficient funds, from whatever source, appropriated and immedi-
ately available to pay the just compensation required under this section and 
unless at that time the federal funds required to be contributed under Section 
131 of Title 23, United States Code, if any, with respect to the outdoor 
advertising being removed, have been appropriated and are immediately 
available to this state. ' 
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 11; 1971, ch. 61, 1992, deleted "Section 27-12-136.8 or* before 
§ 9; 1981, ch. 136, § 9; 1989, ch. 22, § 7; 1992, "Section 27-12-136.9" in the last sentence of 
ch. 30, § 61. Subsections (2) and (3). 
Amendment Notes. —- The 1989 amend- Meaning of "this act.* — The phrase "this 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, made stylistic act," in the second sentence in Subsection (2), 
changes in the statutory references and also
 m e ans L. 1967, ch. 51, which enacted §§ 27-12-
made punctuation changes.
 1 3 6 < 1 t o 27-12-136.13. ' 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
27-12-137. Dump grounds, junk, or salvage yards adja-
cent to highways — Regulation authorized — 
Definitions. 
(1) (a) In this section, "junk yard" or "salvage yard" means any establish-
ment having as an integral part any open display, accumulation, or 
collection of discarded, worn out, or abandoned material which may or 
may not be put to some use or have some value, which is offered for sale, 
trade in whole or in part, or kept for storage. 
(b) Junk or salvage yards include: automobile wrecking or salvage 
yards; war surplus yards; yards collecting and displaying worn-out ma-
chinery, equipment, or appliances; and city or town dumps for waste 
material and garbage, 
(2) (a) A city or town may adopt ordinances to regulate the creation or 
maintenance of dump grounds and junk or salvage yards of any type 
within 660 feet of the right-of-way of designated state and federal 
highways within the jurisdictional limits of the adopting city or town. 
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(b) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administral 
Rulemaking Act, the department may make rules to regulate the creat 
and maintenance of junk or salvage yards within 660 feet of the right 
way of designated federal and state highways outside the jurisdictio 
limits of cities and towns. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 137; 1965, ch. stylistic changes and changes in phraseo 
53, § 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 51; 1994, ch. 120, and punctuation. 
§ 42. The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- rewrote former Subsection (1) as present £ 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the section (2), deleting a purpose clause from i 
section; substituted "The department may" for section (a) and adding the code citatiot 
"It shall be within the power of the state of Subsection (b), redesignated former Subsec 
Utah, by and through its road commission, to" (2) as Subsection (1), and made styl 
at the beginning of Subsection (1Kb); and made changes. 
27-12-137.3, Definitions. 
As used in Sections 27-12-137.3 through 27-12-137.13: 
(1) "Automobile graveyard" means any establishment or place of bi 
ness which is maintained, used, or operated for storing, keeping, buyi 
or selling wrecked, scrapped, ruined, or dismantled motor vehicles 
motor vehicle parts. 
(2) "Interstate system" means that portion of the national defei 
system of interstate and defense highways located within this st 
officially designated pursuant to Title 23, United States Code, Highwa 
(3) "Junk" means old or scrap copper, brass, rope, rags, batteries, z 
paper; trash; rubber debris; waste; junked, dismantled, or wrecked an 
mobiles or parts thereof; and iron, steel, and other old or scrap ferrous 
nonferrous material. 
(4) "Junkyard" means any place, establishment, or business ma 
tained, used, or operated for storing, keeping, buying, or selling junk, 
for t he maintenance or operation of an automobile graveyard, and 1 
term includes garbage dumps, recycling facilities, garbage process 
facilities, and sanitary land fills. 
(5) "Primary system" means tha t portion of connected main highwj 
located within this state officially designated pursuant to Title 23, Unii 
States Code, Highways. 
History; L. 1967, ch. 52, § 3; 1991, ch. 137, in present Subsection (4); deleted former £ 
§ 52; 1994, ch. 120, § 43. section (6) defining "commission"; and m 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- changes in punctuation and phraseology, 
ment, effective April 29,1991, substituted "Sec- The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 15 
tions 27-12-137.3 through 27-12-137.13" for in Subsections (2) and (5), deleted "by 
"this act" at the beginning of the section; rear- commission and approved by the secret; 
ranged the subsections in alphabetical order; after "designated" and added "Highways" to 
inserted "recycling facilities, garbage process-
 en (j 
ing facilities" and inserted "land" before "fills" 
27-12-137.4. License required. 
A person may not establish, operate, or maintain a junkyard, any portior 
which is within 1,000 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of\ a 
interstate or primary highway, without obtaining a license to do so from 1 
department. 
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R933. Preconstruction, Right of Way 
Acquisition. 
R933-1. Right of Way Acquisition. 
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs. 
R933-3. Relocation or Modification of Existing Authorized 
Access Openings or Granting New Access Openings on 
Limited Access Highways. 
R933-1. Right of Way Acquisition. 
R933-1-1. Right of Way Acquisition Incorporation of Fed-
eral Publication. 
R933-1-1. Right of Way Acquis i t ion Incorpora-
t i on of Federal Publ icat ion . 
The State of Utah incorporates by reference 49 
CFR 24 as amended in the Federal Register, March 
2, 1989, as its administrative rules on the acquisi-
tion of rights of way. 
References: 27-12-89 through 103. 
History: 13864, AMD, 01/14/93. 
R 9 3 3 - 2 . C o n t r o l o f O u t d o o r A d v e r t i s i n g 
S i g n s . 
R933-2-1. Purpose. 
R933-2-2. Federal Regulations. 
R933-2-3. Definitions. 
R933-2-4. Permits. 
R933-2-5. Sign Changes, Repairs, and Maintenance. 
R933-2-6. Commercial and Industrial Usage: Limitations 
in Zoned or Unzoned Areas. 
R933-2-7. Spacing For Permitted Signs. 
R933-2-8. Removal of Illegal Signs. 
R933-2-9. Termination of Non-Conforming Use Status. 
R933-2-10. Conforming Sign Becoming Nonconforming — 
Removal. 
R933-2-11. On-Premise Signs — Illegal Status — Re-
moval. 
R933-2-12. Directional Signs. 
R933-2-13. Official Signs. 
R933-2-14. Department Hearings. 
R933-2-15. Prosecution for Violation of Act or Rules. 
R933-2-16. Saving Clause. 
R933-2-17. Effective Date. 
R933-2-1. Purpose . 
The purpose of these rules is to implement the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. Nothing in these 
rules shall be construed to permit outdoor advertis-
ing tha t would disqualify the State for Federal 
participation of funds under the Federal standards 
applicable. The Transportation Commission and the 
Utah Department of Transportation shall, through 
designated personnel, control outdoor advertising on 
interstate and primary highway systems. 
R933-2-2. Federal Regulat ions . 
The federal regulations governing outdoor adver-
tising contained in 23 CFR section 750.101 through 
section 750.713 (April 1, 1994) are adopted and 
incorporated by this reference. 
R933-2-3. Definitions. 
All references in these Rules to Sections 27-12-
136.1 through 27-12-136.13, are to those sections of 
the Utah Code known as the Utah Outdoor Adver-
tising Act. In addition to the definitions in Section 
27-12-136.3, the following definitions a re supplied: 
(1) "Abandoned Sigh" means any controlled sign, 
the sign facing of which has been partially obliter-
ated, has been painted out, has remained blank or 
has obsolete advertising mat ter for a continuous 
period of twelve (12) months or more. 
(2) "Act" means the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
(3) "Advertising" means any message, whetb 
words, symbols, pictures or any combination the 
painted or otherwise applied to the face of an 
door advertising structure, which message is 
signed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, 
which message is visible from any place on the i 
travel-way of the interstate or primary high 
system. 
(4) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of 
door advertising" as used in Subsection 2rt 
136.3(3) of the Act is defined to include area 
which the primary activity is outdoor advertish 
(5) "Commercial or industrial zone" as define 
Subsection 27-12-136.3(2)(d) of the Act is further 
defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside 
the boundaries of urbanized counties and outside 
the boundaries of cities and towns referred to in tha t 
subsection, such areas not within 8420 feet of an 
interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as 
measured from the nearest point of the beginning or 
ending of the pavement widening at the exit from or 
entrance to the main traveled way tha t are reserved 
for business, commerce, or t rade under enabling 
state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordi-
nances or regulations, and are actually used for 
commercial or industrial purposes, including the 
land along both sides of a controlled highway for 600 
feet immediately abutting the area of use, measure-
ments under this subsection being made from the 
outer edge of regularly used buildings, parking lots, 
gate-houses, entrance gates, or storage or processing 
areas. 
(6) "Conforming Sign* means an off-premise sign 
maintained in a location tha t conforms to the size, 
lighting, spacing, zoning and usage requirements as 
provided by law and these rules. 
(7) "Controlled Sign" means any off-premise sign 
tha t is designed, intended, or used to advertise or 
inform any part of the advertising or informative 
contents of which is visible from any place on the 
main traveled way of any interstate or federal-aid 
primary highway in this State. 
(8) "Destroyed Sign" means a sign damaged by 
natural elements wherein the costs of re-erection 
exceeds 30 percent of the depreciated value of the 
sign as established by departmental appraisal meth-
ods. 
(9) "Freeway" means a divided highway for 
through traffic with full control access. 
(10) "Grandfather Status" refers to any off-
premise controlled sign erected in zoned or unzoned 
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commercial or industrial areas, prior to May 9,1967, 
even if the sign does not comply with the size, 
lighting, or spacing of the Act and these Rules. Signs 
only, and not sign sites, may qualify for such status. 
(11) "H-l" means highway service zone as denned 
in Subsection 27-12-136.3(8) of the Act. 
(12) "Lease or Consent* means any written agree-
ment by which possession of land, or permission to 
use land for the purpose of erecting or maintaining a 
sign, or both, is granted by the owner to another 
person for a specified period of time. 
(13) "Legal copy" means the advertising copy on 
the sign that occupies at least 50% of the sign size. 
(14) "Nonconforming Sign" means a sign that was 
lawfully erected, but that does not conform to State 
law or rules passed or made at a later date or that 
later fails to comply with State legislation or rules 
because of changed conditions. The term "illegally 
erected" or "illegally maintained" is not synonymous 
with the term, "nonconforming sign," nor is a sign 
with "grandfather" status synonymous with the 
term, "nonconforming sign." 
(15) "Off-Premise Sign" means also, in supplement 
to the definition stated in the Act, an outdoor adver-
tising sign that advertises an activity, service or 
product and that is located on premises other than 
the premises at which such activity or service occurs 
or product is sold or manufactured. 
(16) "On-Premise Sign", in supplement to the 
definition stated in the Act, does not include a sign 
that advertises a product or service that is only 
incidental to the principal activity or that brings 
rental income to the property owner or occupant. 
(17) "Out-of-Standard" means any sign that fails 
to meet the standards and criteria set forth in the 
Utah-Federal Agreement of January 18, 1968, or 
more restrictive statutes or rules passed or made 
subsequent thereto as to size, height, lighting, or 
spacing. 
(18) "Parkland" means any publicly owned land 
that is designed or used as a public park, recreation 
area, wildlife or waterfowl refuge, or historical site. 
(19) "Property" as used in the definition of "On-
Premise Sign" includes those areas from which the 
general public is serviced and which are directly 
connected with and are involved in assembling, 
manufacturing, servicing, repairing, or storing of 
products used in the business activity. This property 
does not include the site of any auxiliary facilities 
that are not essential to and customarily used in the 
conduct of business, nor does it include property not 
contiguous to the property on which the sign is 
situated. 
(20) "Sale or Lease Sign" means any sign situated 
on the subject property that advertises that the 
property is for "sale" or "lease". Such a sign may not 
advertise any product or service unrelated to the 
business of selling or leasing the land upon which it 
is located, nor may it advertise a projected use of the 
land or a financing service available or being utilized 
in its development. 
- (21) "Scenic Area" as used in the Act includes a 
scenic byway. 
(22) "Transient or Temporary Activity" means any 
industrial or commercial activity, not otherwise 
herein excluded, that does not have a prior continu-
ous history for a period of six months. 
(23) "Unzoned Area" means an area in which no 
zoning is in effect. It does not include areas within 
comprehensive zoning or master plans adopted by 
local zoning authorities. * 
(24) "V-iype Sign" means any sign, the center pole 
of which is nearest the traveled portion of the 
highway and is a common pole to the two sign faces, 
or if such common pole is not used, a sign with the 
sign faces no further than 36 inches apart at the 
angle of the sign closest to the traveled portion of the 
highway, and the structure poles at the point near-
est the traveled portion of the highway no further 
apart than 48 inches. Existing V-type signs now 
controlled and permitted are excluded from this 
definition. 
(25) "Visible" means capable of being seen whether 
or not readable, without visual aid, by a person of 
normal visual acuity. 
R933-2-4. Permits. 
(1) All controlled outdoor advertising signs legally 
in existence prior to the effective date of the 1967 
Act, or that are legally created thereafter, must have 
a permit. This includes off-premise signs located on 
the side of or on top of any fixed object or building 
and visible from the main traveled way of an inter-
state or federal-aid primary highway. 
(2) Anyone preparing to erect a controlled sign 
shall apply for the permit before beginning construc-
tion of the sign. Permits shall be issued in the 
manner prescribed in Section 27-12-136.7. Permits 
may be issued only for signs that are to be erected in 
commercial or industrial zones or in unzoned com-
mercial or industrial areas, as denned by the Act. 
Insomuch as a sign cannot lawfully be constructed 
or maintained unless there is legal access to the 
property on which the sign is proposed to be located, 
a permit may not be issued if the applicant does not 
have legal access to that property. 
(3) Permits may be issued only for signs already 
lawfully erected or to be lawfully erected within 90 
days from the date of the issuance of the permit. 
Within 30 days from the date of issuance, the permit 
must be affixed to the completed sign for which the 
permit was issued as provided in subsection 5 of this 
section. 
(4) A permit affixed to a sign other than the sign 
for which it was issued is unlawful, and remedial 
action shall be taken by the permittee by the proper 
affixing of the permit to the correct sign within 30 
days of notice to the permittee. 
(5) Permits issued under Section 27-12-136.7 shall 
be permanently attached to the sign in such a 
position so as to be readily visible from the nearest 
highway in the direction of travel to the sign faces. If 
the sign is a single-face cross-highway reader, then 
the permit must be attached to the sign in a position 
readily visible from the nearest traveled portion of 
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the highway. The permittee is responsible for the 
proper placement of the permit on the sign. 
(6) Sign permits that have been lost or destroyed 
must be replaced, and new permits for signs other-
wise lawful shall be issued upon the payment of a 
$25.00 fee for each sign and the completion of a new 
permit application. ^ , < .^ 
(7) Permits shall be issued on a one year fiscal 
basis, and shall be renewed on or before the first day 
of July of each year. 
(8) The fee for a new permit is $100.00* for the 
one-year fiscal period or any part thereof. The per-
mit expires June 30 of the fiscal year. The fee for 
permit renewal is $25.00 for the one-year fiscal 
period or any part thereof. 
(9) The fee for permits issued within a one-year 
fiscal period shall not be prorated. 
(10) One-year permit renewals shall be made on 
renewal
 v forms prepared by the Department. 
Completion of the renewal application and obtaining 
of the renewal permit prior to the expiration of the 
existing permit shall be the sole responsibility of the 
owner. The renewal may be applied for no sooner 
than 60 days prior to July 1 of the year in which the 
permit is to be renewed. 
(11) Written proof of lease or consent from site 
owner to erect or maintain an outdoor advertising 
sign must be furnished by the applicant at the time 
of application for an original permit. This proof may 
consist of an affidavit showing the landowner's name 
and address, the signowner's name, and the sign 
location by route, milepost, address, and county. On 
renewal of the permit the applicant must certify that 
the sign site is still under valid lease to the appli-
cant. 
(12) If a one-year permit on a conforming sign is 
not renewed on or before July 1 of the year of its 
term, a new permit application shall be required for 
a new permit, along with a fee of $100.00. 
(13) A permit issued under Section 27-12-136.7. is 
non transferable, and the permittee shall be liable 
for any violation of the law regarding the permitted 
sign. No new permit may be issued for a sign for 
which a permit has already been issued, except as 
follows: 
(a) Transfer of ownership of a permitted sign shall 
require the holder of the valid permit to release, in 
writing, his rights to continue to maintain his sign 
or use his location for outdoor advertising. The new 
owner applicant shall then submit to the Utah 
Department of Transportation the said written re-
lease and proof of having obtained sign ownership, 
and a valid lease or consent for the remainder of the 
permit term. A $100.00 fee shall accompany the 
application and both application and fee must be 
received within 30 days of the ownership transfer. 
(b) A conforming sign that is unlawful and for-
feited by the permittee may be acquired and permit-
ted, providing the new sign applicant submits the 
completed permit application and proof of posses-
sion of a valid land lease or consent to maintain a 
sign at the described location and providing the new 
application and the sign are otherwise lawful. 
(14)-A supplemental application fee of $100.00 
shall be charged to cover administrative and inspec-
tion costs for every sign that was erected without a 
sign permit (R-299) or altered without prior written 
approval of the department (R-407). This supple-
mental fee is in addition to the regular $100.00 
permit fee.
 r 
(15) Each application for a new permit must be 
accompanied by the approved building permit of the 
local governing authority or a written statement 
from that authority that building permits are not 
required under its ordinances. 
(16) Where local authority has issued a building 
permit for construction of a sign, but such construc-
tion is contrary to the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, 
the action of the local authority does not require the 
State to issue a permit. 
(17) Federal agencies, State agencies, counties, 
cities and towns that use outdoor advertising signs 
along the interstate or primary highway systems 
shall have a permit for each controlled sign as 
provided in the Act and these rules. 
R933-2-5. Sign Changes, Repairs, and Mainte-
nance. 
(1) Sign changes or repairs, including those for 
signs in a commercial or industrial zone, are subject 
to the following requirements: 
(a) The face of a controlled sign may be removed 
for maintenance and renovation or change of adver-
tising copy using basically the same face material. 
The shape and size of advertising space may not be 
changed except as provided in these rules. Replace-
ment of the sign face must be accomplished within a 
60 day period from the date of its removal. 
(b) A nonconforming sign with "Grandfather Sta-
tus" may not be relocated, structurally altered, nor 
repositioned, including reversing the direction of the 
sign face. 
(c) A conforming sign may be reshaped or modified 
as to height or size, or relocated upon proper written 
request (R-407), provided such change is in compli-
ance with the Act and these rules. Any such change 
shall be completed within 60 calendar days from the 
date of the approval of the request. A fee of $100.00 
shall accompany the R-407 application to change the 
sign, in addition to any applicable fee under R933-
2-4(14). 
(d) A conforming sign that is damaged by vandals, 
storms, wind, or acts of nature can be re-erected or 
changed, or both, upon proper written request and 
approval on Form R-407. 
(e) A nonconforming sign that is damaged but not 
destroyed by vandals or acts of nature may be 
repaired to the same size or shape upon proper 
written application and approval. Normal mainte-
nance may be included in the repair, but no struc-
tural changes affecting the sign's value may be 
allowed. The sign may be purchased by the State if 
agreement is reached by the State and the sign 
owner. The compensation to the sign owner shall be 
the depreciated value of the sign immediately before 
damage, less cost of re-erection or repair. 
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(f) Repairs and ordinary maintenance may be 
made on conforming and nonconforming signs so 
long as such repairs do not alter the basic advertis-
ing space or illumination, or change the material of 
the sign structure. 
(g) Nonconforming signs destroyed by natural 
disaster are not eligible for compensation, unless at 
the time of destruction they have been appraised 
and committed for removal and the State has ap-
proved a purchase agreement. 
(2) The following provisions govern maintenance: 
(a) A legally permitted nonconforming sign may 
remain standing subject to the provisions of the Act 
and these rules so long as it is not changed, (except 
for advertising copy) and is not purchased or con-
demned pursuant to law. 
(b) Signs shall be properly maintained. Improper 
maintenance is considered: 
(i) Paint faded or peeling extensively; 
(ii) Message not visible or illegible; 
(iii) Sheets or panels loose or sagging; 
(iv) Structural supports leaning; 
(v) Substantially damaged by acts of nature or age 
deterioration; 
(vi) Abandoned. 
(c) A sign with any of the deficiencies listed in 
subsection (b) is not in a reasonable state of repair, is 
in violation of the law, and is subject to removal. 
(d) The crossing of a right-of-way line of any State 
highway at other than an established access ap-
proach to erect or maintain a sign without the 
written permission of the Department, is unlawful. 
R933-2-6. Commercial and Industrial Usage: 
Limitations in Zoned or Unzoned Areas. 
(1) Controlled signs in zoned or unzoned indus-
trial or commercial areas are subject to the following 
zoning and usage requirements: 
(a) Commercial or industrial usage must be visible 
from a traveled portion of the highway and must be 
situated within 600 feet of the sign site (measured 
from, the outer edge of the regularly used buildings, 
parking lot, storage or processing area of the activ-
ity). 
v
 (b) The sign site must be zoned commercial or 
industrial or be in an unzoned commercial or indus-
trial area. <- -
(2) Airport runways or parking or aircraft tie down 
areas are not zoned or unzoned commercial or in-
dustrial areas. 
(3) Mining operations and related activities, in-
cluding gravel pits are not zoned or unzoned com-
mercial or industrial areas unless they are: 
(a) Where the final and concentrated processing of 
mined or extracted minerals is effected; or 
(b) Where the mined material which has been 
processed is regularly stored or held for sale or 
shipment. - ' ' 
(4) Farming or ranching areas or related dairy 
farm facilities, of whatever nature, are not zoned or 
unzoned commercial or industrial areas. *~ K. < 
^ • (5) Municipal or private golf courses or cemeteries 
are not zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial 
areas. « \***"' *&- .suc-aci i* *d*s&*#i ~&^ "•.« 
(6) A trailer or mobile home park, court, or facility 
does not qualify under Subsection 27-12-136.4(l)(d) 
or (e) regardless of the local zoning. An RV Park does 
not qualify under either of those subsections unless 
at least three-fourths of the total available trailer 
parking spaces are not occupied or reserved for 
rental on a month-to-month basis. 
(7) Where an occupied residence is located along 
the highway right of way within 600 feet of a 
commercial or industrial activity, no controlled sigfi 
may be erected closer than one hundred (100) feet of 
the residence unless the owner of the residence 
expressly waives in writing the foregoing restriction. 
The waiver must be submitted with the permit 
application prior to the erection of a new sign. 
(8) Where the width of the right of way in a 
commercial or industrial area is more than 300 feet, 
and there is commercial activity on only one side of 
the highway, that activity does not qualify the oppo-
site side of the highway as commercial or industrial 
usage for the purpose of erecting new outdoor adver-
tising signs. 
R933-2-7. Spacing For Permitted Signs. 
(1) Spacing of permitted signs shall be as follows: 
(a) Signs in unincorporated areas may not be 
spaced less than 500 feet apart on the interstate and 
federal-aid primary system, as measured parallel to 
the highway right of way. Any sign allowed to be 
erected in a highway service zone (H-l) may not be 
less than 500 feet from an existing controlled sign 
adjacent to an interstate highway or primary high-
way except that signs may be erected less than 500 
feet from each other if the sign faces on the same 
side of the interstate highway or limited access 
primary highway are not simultaneously visible. 
(b) No sign may be erected more than 100 feet on 
the perpendicular from the edge of the right of way 
of an interstate or primary highway except where a 
non-controlled highway or railroad right of way runs 
contiguous and adjacent to the edge of the controlled 
highway. The 100-foot corridor shall then be mea-
sured from a point on the perpendicular not to 
exceed 200 feet from the edge of the right of way of 
the interstate or primary highway. In no case may 
the outer edge of the corridor exceed 350 feet from 
the controlled right of way. 
(c) Any sign located within the controlled area of 
both the interstate system and a primary system 
must meet the spacing requirements of both high-
way systems. 
(d) If a sign message may be read from two or more 
routes, one or more of which is a controlled route, 
the more stringent of applicable control require-
ments applies. «, 
(2) Height Above Highway: * - -
No new structure, including the sign face, may be 
more than 50 feet in height above the elevation of 
the edge of the traveled surface of the highway. 
Where local zoning requirements or ordinances are 
in effect, the stricter of any appUcable zoning re-
quirements or ordinances apply. *w JA, J*TU r.*. u,- **• 
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R933-2-8. Removal of Illegal Signs. 
(1) Removal Costs: The costfor the removal by the 
Utah Department of Transportation of an illegal or 
abandoned sign shall be assessed jointly and sever-
ally against the signowner, landowner, occupant of 
the land or other responsible person, or any combi-
nation thereof, in accordance with Section 27-12-
136.9. * r 
(2) Storage Charges: Illegal or abandoned signs 
that have been removed by the Department after 
proper notice to the sign and site owner or occupant 
of the land shall be stored at the nearest department 
shed. There shall be a charge of $25.00 per month 
levied as the storage charges. The storage charges 
shall be in addition to the costs of the removal of the 
illegal or abandoned sign. 
(3) Redemption and Disposal: If the illegal or 
abandoned sign has not been claimed and redeemed 
within 30 days from the date of removal, notice to 
the sign owner, site owner, and occupant of the land 
shall be given. If the sign is not redeemed within 30 
days thereafter, a designated Department official in 
the area in which the sign is stored shall proceed to 
dispose of the stored illegal or abandoned sign by 
either utilizing the material contained therein for 
Utah Department of Transportation maintenance 
purposes or destroying the sign. A statement of the 
sign disposal shall be made and filed with a desig-
nated person at the Department. 
R933-2-9. Termination of Non-Conforming Use 
Status. 
(1) The non-conforming use status of a controlled 
sign shall terminate under the following conditions: 
(a) Failure of the sign owner to apply for a renewal 
permit on or before the date on which the permit 
expires; 
(b) Structural alteration or change of the sign as to 
height, size, location or direction of sign face not 
constituting ordinary maintenance or a change of 
advertising matter; 
(c) Destruction by storm, wind, act of nature, fire 
or vandalism; 
(d) Abandonment; 
(e) Failure to correct after receiving proper notice 
pursuant to Section 27-12-136.9, or failure to ask for 
a hearing after receiving proper notice pursuant to 
Section 27-12-136.9, or failure to file a written 
response as required by law, or failure to appeal 
from an adverse decision of the Department, or 
exhaustion of all legal remedies under Section 27-
12-136.9. 
(f) Purchase by the Department under Section 
27-12-136.11. 
(g) Acquisition at any time by the Department for 
highway construction. 
R933-2-10. Conforming Sign Becoming Non-
conforming — Removal. 
(1) Any legal conforming sign that becomes non-
conforming after May 9, 1967, (by reason of law or 
route classification) may not be required to be re-
moved under the Utah Advertising Act until after 
the end of the fifth year after it had become noncon-
forming, except as otherwise provided for by law or 
contract. < •> „ 
R933-2-11. On-Premise Signs — Illegal Status 
— Removal. 
An on-premise sign loses its on-premise status 
when the business or activity it advertises has 
ceased to exist for a period of at least 12 months at 
the site of the sign, the sign is located within 1000 
feet of a controlled highway, and the message 
thereon is visible to the traveling public from such 
highway. Any such sign may be removed at the 
expense of the sign owner or land owner or both 
without compensation to the sign or site owner as 
provided in Section 27-12-136.9 of the Act. 
R933-2-12. Directional Signs. 
(1) Directional signs shall conform to federal stan-
dards concerning the lighting, size, number, and 
spacing of the signs. There are no zoning or usage 
requirements for directional signs. 
(2) The following standards apply only to direc-
tional signs that are erected and maintained adja-
cent to the interstate and federal-aid primary high-
way system, and that are visible from the main 
traveled way. 
(a) A directional sign allowed under the Utah Code 
is subject to the following restrictions: 
(i) No sign may exceed the following limits (all 
dimensions include border and trim, but exclude 
supports): 
(A) Maximum area - 150 square feet 
(B) Maximum height • 20 feet 
(C) Maximum length - 20 feet 
(ii) A sign may be illuminated, subject to the 
following: 
(A) Signs that are not effectively shielded so as to 
prevent Ught from being directed at any portion of 
the traveled way of an interstate or primary high-
way, or that cause glare or impair the vision of the 
driver of any motor vehicle, or that otherwise inter-
fere with any driver's operation of a motor vehicle, 
are prohibited. 
(B) No sign may be so illuminated as to obscure or 
interfere with the effectiveness of an official traffic 
sign, device, or signal. 
(iii) Each location of a directional sign must be 
approved by the Department and is subject to the 
following restrictions: 
(A) No directional sign may be located within 2000 
feet of an interchange or intersection at grade within 
the interstate system or other freeways or the pri-
mary system (measured from the nearest point of 
pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to 
the main traveled way). 
(B) No directional sign may be located within 2000 
feet of a rest area, parkland, or scenic areas. 
(C) Directional signs facing the same direction of 
travel shall be spaced no less than one mile apart. 
(D) No more than one directional sign per activity 
facing the same direction of travel may be erected 
along a single route approaching the activity. 
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(E) Signs adjacent to the interstate or primary 
system shall be located within 15 air miles of the 
activity they advertise. 
(iv) Any area of historical interest shall be ap-
proved by the Utah Historical Society before consid-
eration for approval as an area for a directional sign. 
(b) The following directional signs are prohibited: 
(i) Signs advertising activities that are illegal 
under Federal or State law in effect at the location of 
those signs or activities: 
(ii) Signs positioned in such a manner as to 
obscure or otherwise interfere with the effectiveness 
of an official traffic sign, signal, or device, or to 
obstruct or interfere with the driver's view of ap-
proaching, merging, or intersecting traffic; 
(iii) Signs erected or maintained upon trees or 
painted or drawn upon rocks, or other natural fea-
tures; 
(iv) Obsolete signs; 
(v) Signs that are structurally unsafe or in disre-
pair, 
(vi) Signs that contain or are illuminated by any 
flashing or moving light or animated by moving 
parts; 
(vii) Signs located in rest areas, parklands, or 
scenic areas; 
(3) Any directional sign erected or maintained 
under the Act and these rules may at any time be 
removed for cause upon order of the Department 
after notice and hearing, if requested and timely 
pursued, under Section 27-12-136.9. 
R933-2-13. Official Signs. 
(1) Prerequisites for Erection and Maintenance: 
(a) Prior to erection of an official sign the public 
agency shall submit to the Department in the Dis-
trict where the sign is to be located, a completed 
permit application form R-299 along with: 
(i) Facsimile of the sign message to be erected; 
(ii) Statement of the official duty or responsibility 
being performed; 
(iii) Certified copy of the statute, resolution, or 
ordinance from the public body showing official 
action authorizing erection and maintenance of the 
sign. -
(b) The sign must be erected off the highway 
right-of-way, owned and maintained by the public 
agency, and located within the zoning jurisdiction of 
the public agency. 
(c) Standards, Criteria and Restrictions: 
(i) Only information of general interest to the 
traveling public may be placed on an official sign. 
Commercial advertising of a particular service, 
product or facility is prohibited. 
(ii) The sign must be within the zoning jurisdic-
tion of the city, town, or other public agency desig-
nated by the sign. 
(iii) No city, town or other subdivision of the State 
may erect or maintain more than one sign at each 
approach to the off-ramp, facing oncoming traffic at 
the nearest point of turn off to such city, town or 
other subdivision and in no event may more than 
two such signs, one for each direction of travel upon 
the controlled highway, be erected and maintained 
by or for the purpose of designating a city or town or 
other subdivision. 
(iv) No official sign may be located within 2000 
feet of an interchange or intersection at grade along 
the interstate or primary highway system (mea-
sured from the nearest point of pavement widening 
at the exit from the main traveled way.) 
(v) No official sign may be so illuminated as to 
interfere with the effectiveness of, or obscure, an 
official traffic sign, device, or signal. 
(vi) Signs that are not effectively shielded so as to 
prevent light from being directed at any portion of 
the traveled way of an interstate or primary high-
way, or that cause glare or impair the vision of the 
driver of any motor vehicle, or that otherwise inter-
fere with any driver's operation of a motor vehicle, 
are prohibited. 
(vii) No sign may be located within 500 feet of a 
rest area, parkland, cemetery, or scenic area or other 
official sign. 
(viii) No sign may be erected at a site prohibited 
under local zoning. The stricter commercial and 
industrial zoning and usage requirements appli-
cable to controlled outdoor advertising signs do not 
apply to official signs, though all other relevant rules 
apply. 
(ix) No sign message may be altered without prior 
written approval by the department. 
(x) Any official sign erected or maintained under 
the Act and these Rules may at any time be removed 
for cause and without compensation after notice and 
hearing, if required. The owner of any such sign 
shall remove the sign at its own cost and expense. 
R933-2-14. Department Hearings. 
Any hearing regarding the legality of a sign shall 
be held in the region where the sign is located, and 
shall be held in accordance with the Act, and in 
accordance with the Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act and Rule R907-1 of the Utah Administra-
tive Code unless specifically stated otherwise in a 
governing statute. 
R933-2-15. Prosecution for Violation of Act or 
Rules. 
Notice to the sign owner or site owner is not 
necessary prior to the filing of a complaint under 
Section 27-12-136.12. 
R933-2-16. Saving Clause. 
The Rules contained herein supersede all other 
Rules heretofore adopted by the Department. If a 
final court order determines that any provision of 
these Rules is invalid for any reason, or that the 
application of any provision is invalid, the court's 
determination shall not affect the validity and en-
forceability of the remainder of these Rules. 
R933-2-17. Effective Date. 
Upon their adoption by the Utah Transportation 
Commission, these Rules shall become effective in 
accordance with the Utah Administrative Rule-
making Act. 
6 UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE January 1,1996 
PRECONSTRUCTION, RIGHT OF WAY ACQUISITION R933-3-6. 
<References: 27-12-136.1 through 27-12-136.13. : j <> , \ 
History: 9344, EMR, 04/25/88; 15895, NEW, .07/15/94; 
16111, NSC, 09/01^4. 
R933-3. Relocat ion or Modification of Ex-
is t ing Authorized Access Openings or 
Granting N e w Access Openings on Lim-




R933-3-4. When Access is Controlled. 
R933-3-5. Designation of Access Location. 
R933-3-6. Revision of Access Openings. 
R933-3-7. New Access Openings. 
R933-3-8. Document Responsibility. 
R933-3-9. Enforcement of Access Control. 
R933-3-1. Authority. 
' This rule is allowed under Section 27-12-114 of 
Utah Code. 
R933-3-2. Purpose, 
To establish a procedure for designating and es-
tablishing new or existing highways as limited ac-
cess facilities, for the elimination of intersections 
and for the right to access restricted facilities. 
R933-3-3. Definition. 
Limited-access facility shall be denned as in Sec-
tion 27-12-2(5) of the Utah Code. 
R933-3-4. When Access is Controlled. 
A. Limited access control for functionally classi-
fied principal arterial highways other than the in-
terstate system and expressways shall be obtained 
in all rural areas and in urban areas if the highway 
is being constructed on new alignment or if the 
existing highway is in sparsely developed areas 
where control is desirable and economically feasible. 
Control in urban areas on existing alignment shall 
not be allowed unless designated by the Utah Trans-
portation Commission. 
B. In addition to the limited access control of 
principal arterial highways, a limited mileage of 
high volume minor arterial highways may justify 
limited access control, especially if on new align-
ment and if adjacent to a freeway interchange. 
Except for minor arterial highways adjacent to a 
freeway interchange, control shall not be estab-
lished if the road is less than one mile in length. 
Access, if desirable and economically feasible on 
such roads, shall be determined on an individual 
basis and is subject to approval of Utah Transporta-
tion Commission. 
C. Under limited access control, the following 
limitations shall apply: 
1. The maximum feasible and economic access 
control shall always be obtained. 
2. On bypasses of cities and towns, all property 
^ access shall be prohibited except where the bypass is 
" of a low population town with little or no business 
and inadequate public crossroads for property ac-
cess. ** 
3. On other than bypass roads, a maximum of five 
accesses per mile on each Bide of the highway, may 
be granted. Unless justified under this rule, accesses 
to property shall only be granted opposite to each 
other. < . *. 
4. Where any one property has access to another 
public road or roads, no access shall be given closer 
than one-half mile from the public road nor shall any 
two granted accesses be closer than one-half mile 
with the following exception: The proposed project 
involves reconstruction on, or near to, an existing 
highway where a home, business or other property 
development is located and lack of direct access to 
them would involve excessive property damage and 
added construction costs, in which case access open-
ings can be provided within the other stated limita-
tions.
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5. No property access shall be closer than 500 feet 
from another property or public road access. 
6. In order to eliminate public road access, study 
shall be made in conjunction with local authorities 
as to feasibility of dead ending or rerouting of 
intersecting roads. 
7. The maximum size of private access openings 
are shall be 16 feet for residences, 30 feet for farms 
or other areas where large equipment is used, and 
50 feet for commercial and industrial areas. 
D. Exceptions to the above limitations shall only 
be made if a careful appraisal reveals extensive 
damage or if needed frontage roads would involve 
excessive right of way costs or, in canyons, excessive 
construction costs. Detailed reports of costs and 
justification for variance shall be prepared and sub-
mitted to the assistant director for approval. 
R933-3-5. Designation of Access Location. 
A. The Utah Department of Transportation Right 
of Way division shall conduct a study and prepare 
detailed right of way maps, to be used by the Utah 
Transportatiorr~ Commission to make final access 
location determination. The study will include the 
location of and justification for current access open-
ings and property owners shall be contacted to 
determine development plans for the property. The 
Right of Way Division shall prepare cost estimates 
for proposed and alternate access locations. The 
Utah Transportation Commission shall make final 
access location determination. 
B. The access openings granted shall be accu-
rately described in the property deed and shown on 
right of way maps and roadway construction plans. 
C. After execution of the deeds, no change shall be 
made in the access location or additional access 
openings granted except as provided below. 
D. If a portion of a property which has no access to 
the highway is later sold, the department has no 
obligation to grant an access to the property and if 
inquiries are made, a prospective buyer should be 
definitely so advised. 
R933-3-6. Revision of Access Openings. 
A If a property owner desires to change location 
or size of an access opening, after execution of the 
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Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to 
the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of 
any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) 
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a 
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has 
once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
-proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
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KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Edward Rogers, individually and as to his : 
assigned interest in Utah Outdoor Advertising, 
TERRY REID, individually and as to his assigned AFFIDAVIT OF 
interest in Utah Outdoor Advertising, UTAH GORDON ROBERTS 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, dba, UTAH SIGN, : 
INC., LYNN D. KITCHEN, individually, BETH 




STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, and 
BURBIDGE AND MITCHELL, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant Gordon Roberts, being first duly sworn, deposes and states the following: 
Civil No. 970906625 CV 
Judge L. A. Dever 
EXHIBIT "»' 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah. I was admitted 
to the Utah State Bar in 1965. 
2. I am currently a shareholder in the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer. My 
practice emphasizes civil trials. I am a Fellow in the American College of Trial Lawyers. 
3. I have been retained as an expert consultant by defendants in this case. 
4. I have reviewed pleadings, discovery materials and correspondence from the 
underlying case ROA Advertising. Inc. v. Lvnn P. Kitchen, et al. I have also discussed the 
underlying case with defendant Stephen B. Mitchell ("Mitchell"). 
5. It is my opinion that in connection with the Rule 41 (a) issue, neither Mitchell 
nor Burbidge and Mitchell committed a breach of the applicable standard of care which resulted in 
any damage to plaintiffs. 
6. I disagree with plaintiffs' allegation that defendants breached the applicable 
standard of care by not filing a Motion to Pismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
7. Mitchell's tactical decision not to file a Rule 41(a) motion was sound for the 
following reasons: 
a. A Rule 41(a) motion would not have succeeded in dismissing Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising's ("Reagan's") claim for actual forcible entry because the forcible entry 
claim was a new claim not raised in Reagan's earlier-filed cases. 
2 
b. Reagan's claim against plaintiffs for breach of lease was invalid, as 
witnessed by the fact the trial court eventually granted the Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Mitchell on that claim. In granting summary judgment the court held that Reagan's 
lease had terminated. More importantly, the Motion for Summary Judgment achieved the 
same result with regard to the breach of lease claim that plaintiffs would have achieved by 
filing a Rule 41(a) motion. It is rank speculation to suggest that the summary judgment 
strategy was more costly than the Rule 41(a) strategy. 
c. Mitchell reasonably believed that a Rule 41(a) motion would not 
succeed because the trial court was unlikely to dismiss Reagan's claims with prejudice 
without Reagan having had an opportunity to litigate its claims, especially in light of the 
forcible entry. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment. 
d. Mitchell reasonably believed that Judge Rigtrup, before whom the 
case was then pending, would be less receptive than Judge Young to Utah Sign's claims 
3 
because of Judge Rigtrup's obvious displeasure at Utah Sign's forcible entry upon the 
Kitchen leasehold interest. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment. 
DATED this Jj_ day of August, 1998. 
tfi 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ]9_ day of August, 1998 
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
DOUGLAS T. HALL (1305) 
1775 North, 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801) 521-1775 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. a Utah 




LYNN D. KITCHEN, an individual, 
and BETH K. KITCHEN, an 
individual, aka FULL SERVICES 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, R.O.A. General, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, by and through counsel, and for causes of action 
complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation in good standing, doing 
business in Utah as Reagan Outdoor Advertising (hereinafter 
^^JJI 
COMPLAINT 
J u d g e
 JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
"ROA"), with its principal place of business located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Upon information and belief the defendants, Lynn D. 
Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen (hereinafter the "Kitchens"), are 
husband and wife and are residents of the State of Utah, 
3. Upon information and belief the Full Services 
Development Company is a business entity formerly owned and 
operated by the Kitchens. 
4. The situs of the real property involved in this action 
is in, and the causes of action set forth herein arose in, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
5. On May 12th, 1973, the Kitchens, as lessors, entered 
into an outdoor advertising lease agreement with ROA, as lessee, 
to allow the construction and maintenance of an outdoor 
advertising sign, or billboard, for a period of forty years on 
property located adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 435 
West, 2720 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah. A true and correct 
copy of this agreement (hereinafter the "Lease") is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference incorporated herein. 
6. It was the intent of the parties that paragraph 3 of the 
agreement was exercised simultaneous with the execution of the 
Lease. 
7. An outdoor advertising sign was subsequently constructed 
on the leased property, or premises, at the designated site. ROA 
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has since utilized the sign for outdoor advertising purposes, has 
maintained said sign, and has paid regular rental therefore• 
8. By correspondence dated March 17, 1981, and again by 
subsequent correspondence dated July 20, 1983, ROA reviewed the 
period of the agreement with the Kitchens, and to avoid any 
misunderstanding advised them of the exercise of any option for 
continuation or renewal of the Lease that may not have been 
exercised prior to that time. True and correct copies of said 
correspondence are attached hereto as Exhibits ,fBH and "C", 
respectively, and by reference are incorporated herein. 
9. By recent correspondence dated September 2, 1994, the 
Kitchens have advised ROA of their intent to breach the Lease by 
attempting to enforce a premature termination of ROA!s leasehold 
interest and force the removal of the sign, A true and correct 
copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and 
by reference incorporated herein, 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
10. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 9 of 
this Complaint. 
11. ROA has timely exercised its renewal option under the 
provisions of the Lease. 
12. ROA has continuously tendered rental for the premises, 
to include the period from August of 1993 to date. True and 
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correct copies of said rental checks are attached hereto as 
Exhibit "E" and by reference are incorporated herein. 
13. The Kitchens have taken a position, or course of 
conduct, in accepting said rental payments that is wholly 
inconsistent with their current position that the Lease is now 
subject to termination. 
14. Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by sending to ROA 
a notice of termination while the Lease is in full force and 
effect. 
15. ROAfs utilization of its leasehold interest in the 
above-described premises has resulted in the development of a 
valuable asset, any deprivation of which would result in 
significant pecuniary damages to ROA. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Forcible Entry) 
16. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 15 
of this Complaint. 
17. ROA is currently is peaceable possession of the leased 
premises and continues to maintain its outdoor advertising sign 
on the site. 
18. Kitchens have, by and through their attorneys, indicated 
an intent to forcibly enter upon the premises leased to, and 
being utilized by, ROA to turn ROA out and thereby deprive ROA of 
a unique and valuable asset for which ROA has paid valuable 
consideration. Should such a forcible entry occur it would 
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result in significant pecuniary damages to ROA/ the extent of 
which may be impossible to determine. 
19. Such forcible entry would be in violation of the Lease 
and would entitle ROA to treble damages as provided for by § 78-
36-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Interference with Business Relationships) 
20. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 19 
of this Complaint. 
21. ROA has formed a regular client base as a result of the 
development of its leasehold interest in the subject premises. 
Kitchens have direct knowledge of the utilization of the premises 
for outdoor advertising purposes and that ROA provides outdoor 
advertising services by contract to third parties. 
22. Kitchens' declared intent to force an early termination 
of the Lease and to compel the removal of ROA and its sign from 
the premises will directly interfere with ROAfs ability to 
continue to provide the contracted for outdoor advertising 
services to third parties, of which the Kitchens are well aware. 
23. The Kitchens1 declared intent to interfere with ROA's 
advertising contracts is wilful and intentional. ROA is entitled 
to punitive damages should any interference with its business 
relationships occur as a result of Kitchens1 actions. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Specific Performance) 
24. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 2 3 
of this Complaint. 
25. ROA's outdoor advertising is sited on a unique location 
that cannot be replaced and is made the more valuable thereby. 
ROA is entitled to specific performance of the Lease by the 
Kitchens. 
26. ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances 
described herein that it is entitled specific performance of the 
Lease and, if necessary, an order permanently enjoining the 
Kitchens from interfering with ROA's leasehold in the premises, 
from seeking a premature termination of the Lease, or from 
compelling the removal of ROA's outdoor advertising sign. 
WHEREFORE, ROA prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For an order of specific performance and, if necessary, 
the entry of a permanent injunction against the defendants, their 
successors and assigns, preventing them from interfering with 
ROA's use and enjoyment of the leased premises; 
2. For such damages in the amount of at least $300,000.00, 
as may be incurred by ROA as a result of Kitchensf attempts to 
prematurely terminate the Lease and to compel ROA to vacate the 
premises, as well as an award of treble damages and punitive 
damages in an amount of at least $100,000.00. 
3. For ROA's costs of court incurred herein; and 
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4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper• 
DATED this day of September, 1994 
r^i^ 
Douglas/*!. Hall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
1775 North, 900 West 




B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
DOUGLAS T. HALL (1305) 
1775 North, 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801) 521-1775 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. a Utah [ 
Corporation, dba REAGAN 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, [ 
Plaintiff, [ 
vs. I 
LYNN D. KITCHEN, an individual, | 
and BETH K. KITCHEN, an 
individual, aka FULL SERVICES | 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, UTAH 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., aka 
UTAH SIGN, INC., and JOHN DOES 
III thru V, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 940905728 PR 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, R.O.A. General, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, by and through counsel, pursuant to leave of court, 
amends its earlier filed complaint and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation in good standing, doing 
business in Utah as Reagan Outdoor Advertising (hereinafter 
11
 ROA") , with its principal place of business located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
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2. The defendants, Lynn D. Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen 
(hereinafter the "Kitchens") , are husband and wife and are 
residents of the State of Utah. 
3. Upon information and belief the Full Services 
Development Company is a business entity formerly owned and 
operated by the Kitchens. 
4. The defendant Utah Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Utah Sign"), is a Utah corporation in good standing 
and was first incorporated as Utah Sign, Inc. 
5. The situs of the real property involved in this action 
is in, and the causes of action set forth herein arose in, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
6. On May 12th, 1973, the Kitchens, as lessors, entered 
into an outdoor advertising lease agreement with ROA, as lessee, 
to allow the construction and maintenance of an outdoor 
advertising sign, or billboard, for a period of forty years on 
property located adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 435 
West, 2720 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the 
"Premises") . A true and correct copy of this agreement 
(hereinafter the "Lease") is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
by reference incorporated herein. 
7. An outdoor advertising sign was subsequently constructed 
on the Premises at the designated site. ROA has since utilized 
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the sign for outdoor advertising purposes, has maintained said 
sign, and has paid regular rental therefore. 
8. By correspondence dated March 17, 1981, and again by 
subsequent correspondence dated July 20, 1983, ROA reviewed the 
period of the agreement with the Kitchens, and to avoid any 
misunderstandings advised them of the exercise of any option for 
continuation or renewal of the Lease that may not have been 
exercised prior to that time. True and correct copies of said 
correspondence are attached hereto as Exhibits "Blf and f,CM, 
respectively, and by reference are incorporated herein. 
8. On or about August 29th, 1994, the Kitchens entered into 
a separate outdoor sign location lease with Utah Sign for the 
Premises. 
9. By recent correspondence dated September 2, 1994, the 
Kitchens advised ROA of their intent to breach the Lease by 
attempting to enforce a premature termination of ROA's leasehold 
interest and force the removal of the sign. A true and correct 
copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit ,fD,f and 
by reference incorporated herein. 
10. On September 13th, 1994, counsel for Kitchens served 
upon ROA a "Notice to Quit Premises Within 15 Days." A true and 
correct copy of said notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and 
by reference is incorporated herein. 
11. On or about September 21st, 1994, counsel for the 
Kitchens, after being questioned on the matter by counsel for 
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ROA, advised ROA that the Kitchens would not take any action to 
remove ROA's sign, but would seek relief in the courts. 
12. On or about October 7th, 1994, Utah Sign damaged ROA's 
sign by cutting through the lower support and then removed ROA's 
signs and supporting structures off of the Premises. 
13. Utah Sign then erected a new sign on the Premises 
utilizing ROA's remaining lower support and foundation, and then 
erected blank signs on the structure. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
14. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 13 
of this Complaint. 
15. ROA has timely exercised its renewal option under the 
provisions of the Lease. 
16. ROA has continuously tendered rental for the premises, 
to include the period from August of 1993 to date. 
17. The Kitchens have taken a position, or course of 
conduct, in accepting said rental payments that is wholly 
inconsistent with their current position that the Lease is now 
subject to termination. 
18. Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by sending to ROA 
a notice of termination while the Lease is in full force and 
effect and by allowing Utah Sign to enter upon the Premises to 
remove ROA's sign. 
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19. Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by entering into a 
new lease agreement with Utah Sign while the Lease is in full 
force and effect. 
20. ROA's utilization of its leasehold interest in the 
above-described premises has resulted in the development of a 
valuable asset, any deprivation of which would ^result in 
significant pecuniary damages to ROA. 
21. Kitchen's breach of the Lease has caused ROA 
significant pecuniary damages the full extent of which have yet 
to be determined. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Forcible Entry) 
22. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 
of this Complaint. 
23. ROA was is peaceable possession and undisturbed 
possession of the Premises, and entitled to maintain its outdoor 
advertising sign on the site, when Utah Sign entered the Premises 
and forcible removed ROA from said Premises. 
24. Kitchens and Utah Sign's forcible removing ROA from the 
Premises deprived ROA of a unique and valuable asset for which 
ROA has paid valuable consideration. Defendants1 actions 
resulted in significant pecuniary damages to ROA, the extent of 
which may be impossible to determine. 
25. Such forcible entry is in violation of the Lease and 
entitles ROA to treble damages as provided for by § 78-36-10 of 
the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Interference with Business Relationships) 
26. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 25 
of this Complaint. 
27. ROA has formed a regular client base as a result of the 
development of its leasehold interest in the subject premises. 
Kitchens and Utah Sign have direct knowledge of the utilization 
of the premises for outdoor advertising purposes and that ROA 
provides outdoor advertising services by contract to third 
parties. 
28. Utah Sign's negotiations with the Kitchens to acquire 
a leasehold interest in the Premises and its removal of ROA and 
ROA's sign from the Premises were wilful and intentional acts 
intended to interfere with ROA's business relationship with the 
Kitchens and with ROA's third party contracts and clientele. 
29. Kitchens' lease agreement with Utah Sign, its declared 
intent to force an early termination of the Lease and its removal 
of ROA and its sign from the premises were wilful and intentional 
acts intended to directly interfere with ROA's leasehold interest 
in the Premises and its ability to continue to provide the 
contracted for outdoor advertising services to third parties. 
30. ROA is entitled to an award of punitive damages 
against the Defendants, and each of them jointly and severally, 
as a result of said Defendants1 willful and intentional 
interference with R0Afs business relationships. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Specific Performance) 
31. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 30 
of this Complaint. 
32. ROA's outdoor advertising is sited on a unique location 
that cannot be replaced and is made the more valuable thereby. 
ROA is entitled to specific performance of the Lease by the 
Kitchens. 
33. ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances 
described herein that it is entitled specific performance of the 
Lease and, if necessary, an order permanently enjoining the 
Kitchens from interfering with ROA's leasehold in the premises, 
from seeking a premature termination of the Lease, and to restore 
ROA's sign to the premises, and to bear all costs and expenses 
incurred thereby. 
34. ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances 
described herein that it is entitled to an order requiring Utah 
Sign to restore ROA and its sign to the Premises, and for them to 
bear all costs and expenses incurred thereby. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Treble Damages) 
35. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 34 
of this Complaint. 
36. Outdoor advertising on the Premises is regulated by the 
State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of § 27-12-136.1 et seq. 
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of the Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) , otherwise known as 
the "Utah Outdoor Advertising Act." 
37. ROA holds, and at all pertinent times herein held, the 
only permit authorizing the maintenance of outdoor advertising on 
the Premises. 
38. Pursuant to the provisions of § 27-12-136.9 of the Utah 
Outdoor Advertising Act the Defendants, and each of them, are 
liable to ROA for treble the amount of damages sustained by ROA 
resulting from the damage to, and removal of, the ROA sign. 
39. ROA is also entitled to an award of its attorney's fees 
incurred herein pursuant to the provisions of the above-noted 
section of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conversion) 
40. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 39 
of this Complaint. 
41. After cutting through the lower portion of ROA's sign 
structure Utah Sign then removed the upper portion from the 
Premises and utilized the remains of the ROA structure upon which 
to build their own sign. This was accomplished without ROA's 
permission or approval with the intent to permanently deprive ROA 
of its lower structure. 
42. Utah Sign's actions, accomplished with the approval of 
the Kitchen's, is an unlawful conversion of a significant portion 
of ROA's sign to Defendants' own use and was done by improper 
means for an improper purpose. 
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43 • ROA is entitled to an award of actual and punitive 
damages as against the Defendants. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For a judicial determination that ROA is entitled to 
continue to occupy the Premises, upon regular payment of the 
rental called for in the Lease, to August 4, 2 013; 
2. For an order of specific performance and, if necessary, 
the entry of a permanent injunction against the Defendants, their 
successors and assigns, preventing them from interfering with 
ROA's use and enjoyment of the Premises; 
3. For and order requiring Defendants to restore ROA and 
its sign to the Premises, and that they bear all costs and 
expenses to accomplish this; 
3. For such damages, estimated to be in excess of 
$100,000.00, incurred by ROA as a result of Kitchens1 attempts to 
prematurely terminate the Lease and resulting from Defendants' 
forcible removal of ROA from the Premises; 
4. For an award of treble and punitive damages as against 
the Defendants, jointly and severally, resulting from Defendants1 
forcible entry; 
5. For an award of treble damages resulting from 
Defendants1 violation of the pertinent provisions of the Utah 
Outdoor Advertising Act; 
6. For such actual damages suffered by ROA in such amount 
as can be determined, and an award of punitive damages, resulting 
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from Defendants' willful interference with ROA's contracts, 
business relationships and opportunities; 
7. For such damages, estimated to be in excess of 
$15,000.00, and for punitive damages, resulting from Defendants1 
conversion of ROA's property to their own use; 
8. For ROA's costs of court incurred herein, to include the 
award of reasonable attorneys1 fees; and 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper, 
DATED this &&1 day of November, 1994. 
DouglasfT. Hall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
1775 North, 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Complaint was served upon the Defendants by 
mailing same, first class postage prepaid this day of 
November, 1994, to defendants' counsel identified below. 
J. Scott Brown 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
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Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE and MITCHELL 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
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Telephone: (801) 521-1775 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. a Utah 




LYNN D. KITCHEN, an individual, 
and BETH K. KITCHEN, an 
individual, aka FULL SERVICES 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES I thru V, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, R.O.A. General, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, by and through counsel, and for causes of action 
complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation in good standing, doing 
business in Utah as Reagan Outdoor Advertising (hereinafter 
"ROA"), with its principal place of business located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
COMPLAINT 
C i v i l No. s^ooa 
judge JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAK 
2. Upon information and belief the defendants, Lynn D. 
Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen (hereinafter the "Kitchens"), are 
husband and wife and are residents of the State of Utah. 
3. Upon information and belief the Full Services 
Development Company is a business entity formerly owned and 
operated by the Kitchens. 
4. Defendants John Does I thru V are either business 
entities or individuals, or both, residing in and/or doing 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, their actual 
identities are as yet unknown to the Plaintiff. 
5. The situs of the real property involved in this action 
is in, and the causes of action set forth herein arose in, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
6. On May 12th, 1973, the Kitchens, as lessors, entered 
into an outdoor advertising lease agreement with ROA, as lessee, 
to allow the construction and maintenance of an outdoor 
advertising sign, or billboard, for a period of forty years on 
property located adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 435 
West, 2720 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah. A true and correct 
copy of this agreement (hereinafter the "Lease") is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference incorporated herein. 
7. It was the intent of the parties that paragraph 3 of the 
agreement was exercised simultaneous with the execution of the 
Lease. 
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8. An outdoor advertising sign was subsequently constructed 
on the leased property, or premises, at the designated site. ROA 
has since utilized the sign for outdoor advertising purposes, has 
maintained said sign, and has paid regular rental therefore. 
9. By correspondence dated March 17, 1981, and again by 
subsequent correspondence dated July 20, 1983, ROA reviewed the 
period of the agreement with the Kitchens, and to avoid any 
misunderstanding advised them of the exercise of any option for 
continuation or renewal of the Lease that may not have been 
exercised prior to that time. True and correct copies of said 
correspondence are attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and ,fC", 
respectively, and by reference are incorporated herein. 
10. By recent correspondence dated September 2, 1994, the 
Kitchens have advised ROA of their intent to breach the Lease by 
attempting to enforce a premature termination of ROA's leasehold 
interest and force the removal of the sign. A true and correct 
copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and 
by reference incorporated herein. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
11. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 10 
of this Complaint. 
12. ROA has timely exercised its renewal option under the 
provisions of the Lease. 
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13. ROA has continuously tendered rental for the premises, 
to include the period from August of 1993 to date. True and 
correct copies of said rental checks are attached hereto as 
Exhibit "E" and by reference are incorporated herein. 
14. The Kitchens have taken a position, or course of 
conduct, in accepting said rental payments that is wholly 
inconsistent with their current position that the Lease is now 
subject to termination. 
15. Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by sending to ROA 
a notice of termination while the Lease is in full force and 
effect. 
16. ROA's utilization of its leasehold interest in the 
above-described premises has resulted in the development of a 
valuable asset, any deprivation of which would result in 
significant pecuniary damages to ROA, the full extent of which 
are difficult to determine at this time but would be in excess of 
$300,000.00. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Forcible Entry) 
17. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 16 
of this Complaint. 
18. ROA is currently is peaceable possession of the leased 
premises and continues to maintain its outdoor advertising sign 
on the site. 
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19. Kitchens have, by and through their attorney, indicated 
an intent to forcibly enter upon the premises leased to, and 
being utilized by, ROA to turn ROA out and thereby deprive ROA of 
a unique and valuable asset for which ROA has paid valuable 
consideration. Should such a forcible entry occur it would 
result in significant pecuniary damages to ROA, the extent of 
which may be impossible to determine. 
20. Such forcible entry would be in violation of the Lease 
and would entitle ROA to treble damages as provided for by § 78-
36-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Interference with Business Relationships) 
21. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 20 
of this Complaint, 
22- ROA has formed a regular client base as a result of the 
development of its leasehold interest in the subject premises. 
Kitchens have direct knowledge of the utilization of the premises 
for outdoor advertising purposes and that ROA provides outdoor 
advertising services by contract to third parties. 
23. Kitchens1 declared intent to force an early termination 
of the Lease and to compel the removal of ROA and its sign from 
the premises will directly interfere with ROAfs ability to 
continue to provide the contracted for outdoor advertising 
services to third parties, of which the Kitchens are well aware. 
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24. Plaintiff believes that John Does I thru V are 
attempting to acquire the ROA leasehold for themselves by 
influencing the Kitchens to breach the Lease and to release the 
site to them. 
25. The Kitchens' declared intent to interfere with ROA's 
advertising contracts is wilful and intentional. ROA is entitled 
to punitive damages should any interference with its business 
relationships occur as a result of Kitchens1 actions. 
26. John Does1 I thru V attempts to interfere with ROA's 
leasehold in the premises is wilful and intentional. ROA is 
entitled to punitive damages should any interference with its 
business relationships occur as a result of the John Does1 
actions. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Detrimental Reliance) 
27. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26 
of this Complaint. 
28. ROA has relied upon the provisions of the Lease which 
granted to it a leasehold interest in the property for a period 
of forty years and has acted thereupon accordingly. 
29. ROA has relied upon the acceptance of the Lease by the 
Kitchens, on the Kitchens1 acceptance of the tendered rents (see 
Exhibit "E") and their acknowledgment of the provisions outlined 
in the documents referred to as Exhibits "B" and f,Clf by 
developing the leasehold site, by continuing in possession, by 
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paying rentals therefore, and by entering into third party 
contracts for outdoor advertising services. 
30. Should it be determined that ROAfs reliance upon the 
aforementioned circumstances is misplaced and the Kitchens are 
allowed to terminate the Lease ROA would suffer significant 
pecuniary damages, the full extent of which are difficult to 
determine at this time, but would be in excess of $300,000.00. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Specific Performance) 
31. ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 3 0 
of this Complaint. 
32. ROA's outdoor advertising is sited on a unique location 
that cannot be replaced and is made the more valuable thereby. 
ROA is entitled to specific performance of the Lease by the 
Kitchens. 
33. ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances 
described herein that it is entitled specific performance of the 
Lease and, if necessary, an order permanently enjoining the 
Kitchens from interfering with R0Afs leasehold in the premises, 
from seeking a premature termination of the Lease, or from 
compelling the removal of ROA's outdoor advertising sign. 
WHEREFORE, ROA prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For an order of specific performance and, if necessary, 
the entry of a permanent injunction against the defendants, their 
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successors and assigns, preventing them from interfering with 
ROA's use and enjoyment of the leased premises; 
2. For such damages in the amount of at least $3 00,000,00, 
as may be incurred by ROA as a result of Kitchens1 attempts to 
prematurely terminate the Lease and to compel ROA to vacate the 
premises, as well as an award of treble damages and punitive 
damages in an amount of at least $100,000.00. 
3. For ROA's costs of court incurred herein; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this / 3 ^ day of September, 1994. 
DouglasKT. Hall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
1775 North, 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
/Q 
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